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1. Introduction 
 
Analogical reasoning, reasoning about relational similarity, is often considered to be 
one of the hallmarks of human cognition. Rattermann and Gentner (1998a, pg.275) 
defined it as “the mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base) to another 
domain (the target) in which the systems that holds among the base objects also holds 
among the target objects”. As such, analogical reasoning provides a foundation for 
inductive inference, problem-solving, categorization and decision-making, and it is a 
powerful tool for learning about and explaining the world (Gentner, 2003a; Holyoak, 
Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001; Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008).  
As analogical reasoning plays such an important role in many human cognitive 
abilities, it has been suggested that this ability is the “thing that makes us smart” 
(Gentner, 2003b). However, although analogical reasoning has been studied 
extensively in humans (e.g., Cho, Holyoak, & Cannon, 2007; Gentner, 1977; Gentner & 
Gunn, 2001; Goswami, 1995; Goswami & Pauen, 2005; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984; 
Kroger, Holyoak, & Hummel, 2004; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001, 2005; Paik & Mix, 
2006; Pauen, 1996), we know very little about this cognitive ability in our 
phylogenetically closest living relatives, the other great apes.  
While some researchers have argued that the ability to reason by analogy 
represents the “discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds” (Penn, Holyoak, 
& Povinelli, 2008), others have proposed that if great apes are provided with a symbol 
system that enables them to encode and manipulate relations, then they are capable 
of reasoning by analogy (Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; Premack, 1983; 
Thompson & Oden, 1995, 2000; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). A third view, 
however, is that language - or any other symbol system - is not a prerequisite for an 
animal to be capable of analogical reasoning (Fagot & Parron, 2010; Fagot, 
Wasserman, & Young, 2001; Haun & Call, 2009; Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008).  
There are now many studies that suggest that nonhuman primates can reason 
by analogy. Interestingly, however, most of these studies have used the same kind of 
task; namely, the relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task (Dépy, Fagot, & Vauclair, 
1999; Fagot & Parron, 2010; Fagot, et al., 2001; Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider, 
& Washburn, 2008; Flemming, Beran, & Washburn, 2007; Thompson, et al., 1997). 
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With respect to children though, their reasoning by analogy is affected by numerous 
factors: for example, the surface similarity between the known and novel problems 
(Chen, 1996; Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Holyoak, et al., 1984; Paik & Mix, 
2006); the relational complexity of the problem (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; 
Kroger, et al., 2004; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006); knowledge about the 
relations (Goswami, 1991; Goswami & Brown, 1990); the amount of training and 
instruction given (DeLoache, de Mendoza, & Anderson, 1999; Kotovsky & Gentner, 
1996; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005); and, the presence of an interfering item (Chen, 
2007; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998b; Richland, et al., 2006).  
It is apparent, therefore, that to fully investigate nonhuman primates’ 
analogical abilities, we should present them with various tasks, employing different 
kinds of relations and the relational complexity. Moreover, very few individuals within 
each nonhuman great ape species have been investigated. This means that we do not 
have a clear sense of how general the ability to reason by analogy is within and 
between each species, especially since some discrepancies have already been 
observed between chimpanzees and bonobos, and orangutans and gorillas (see Haun 
& Call, 2009). Obtaining enough data from each species is critical in order to assess 
interspecies differences and to make solid inferences about the evolution of analogical 
reasoning. To date, only one study has directly compared great apes’ performance on 
an analogical reasoning task with that of human children in a comparable manner 
(Haun & Call, 2009). Critically, most studies that have investigated analogical reasoning 
in children have provided children with extensive instructions, and some have even 
provided a straightforward cue indicating where to search for the reward (e.g., in the 
same place, under the same object) (e.g., Blades & Cooke, 1994; Goswami, 1995; 
Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Richland, et al., 2006; Vasilyeva & Bowers, 2010). If we 
want to evaluate the similarities and differences between human and nonhuman 
primates’ reasoning about relational similarity, it is crucial that we present all species 
with formally equivalent tasks that are comparable in terms of their complexity, the 
amount of training provided, and in the instructions given.  
This dissertation had two primary goals: 1) to investigate “language naïve” 
apes’ flexibility in analogical reasoning. More specifically, for that purpose, I used a 
novel paradigm – a relational mapping task, which does not require any prior training. 
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This enabled me to examine apes’ spontaneous reasoning about relations; 2) to 
compare great ape’s analogical reasoning with that of human children. To be able to 
do that, I presented children with almost identical mapping task and I did not provide 
them with any kind of scaffolding – i.e., training trails and verbal instructions. 
 
2. Analogical reasoning 
 
Analogical reasoning refers to reasoning about the relational similarity between two 
problems. More specifically, analogical mapping consists of the alignment of 
representational structures of a base and a target problem, and it requires the 
recognition of relational similarity between these two structures. Such analogical 
mapping allows for inferences to be made from one problem to another. Figure 1 
depicts a very simple example of analogy: item A is bigger than item A’, and item B is 
bigger than item B’. Therefore, the relation that holds between the A and A’ also holds 
between B and B’, meaning that item A maps directly onto item B, and item A’ maps 
directly onto item B’. 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of a simple analogy. The relation that holds between A 
and A’ also holds between B and B’. 
 
2.1. What is a relation? 
 
In order to be able to reason by analogy, an individual first needs to be able to detect 
and reason about relations. A relation could be described as the connection between 
A  
B B’ 
1.) Base problem 
 
 
 
 
2.) Target problem 
A’ 
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two entities, and one’s representation of a relation is generally considered to consist of 
two parts: a predicate and the arguments (Halford, 1999). Relations can be defined 
either as first-order or higher-order relations. First-order relations have objects as 
arguments, whereas higher-order relations have relations as arguments (Halford, 
1999). When a relation includes two arguments and a predicate, then it is called a 
binary relation. Extending this further, a ternary relation includes three arguments, a 
quaternary relation four, and so on. An example of a binary relation would be a 
relation such as BIGGER-THAN (e.g., a chimpanzee is BIGGER-THAN a capuchin 
monkey), where chimpanzee and capuchin monkey are the arguments, and BIGGER-
THAN is the predicate. In addition, chimpanzee and capuchin monkey are both bound 
to their relational role; chimpanzee refers to the bigger entity and capuchin monkey 
the smaller one. As can be seen then, with regard to analogical mapping, the first step 
is to recognize the relation, and the second step is to specify the bindings of the 
relational roles to their arguments (Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003). Human infants can detect violations of specific relations, such as 
support, occlusion or identity from an early age (Baillargeon, 2004; Tyrrell, Stauffer, & 
Snowman, 1991; Tyrrell, Zingaro, & Minard, 1993). However, their ability to reason 
about relations and relational similarity develops gradually over the first few years of 
life.  
 
2.2. Development of analogical reasoning in humans 
 
Analogical reasoning appears to be a higher-order cognitive ability that only develops 
fully late in childhood. To illustrate this, I will focus on the development of the identity 
relation: Infants at 7 months of age can already discriminate between identity/ 
nonidentity relations (Tyrrell, et al., 1991; Tyrrell, et al., 1993). At the age of 2.5 years 
old, children are able to select two identical objects (e.g., two green cups) out of a set 
of three objects, if they have seen two experimenters before them also pick two 
identical objects (e.g., two red cars and two white daisies) (Smith, 1984). At the age of 
6 years old, children begin to pass a task in which they have to match identity/non-
identity relations, but only when there are no perceptual distractors present. It is not 
until the age of 8 years old when children are able to ignore other perceptual 
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distractors and attend fully to the relational commonalities present in the matching 
task (Christie & Gentner, 2007; Thibaut, French, & Vezneva, 2008). Despite this, some 
researchers have argued that one-year-old infants already have a “rudimentary ability” 
to solve problems by analogy (Chen, et al., 1997). For infants at this age, however, 
their ability to transfer a solution from a base problem to an analog target problem 
relies heavily on the shared perceptual similarity between the base and target 
problems. With age, children become increasingly more efficient in solving analogous 
problems that share structural similarity, but almost no featural similarity (Holyoak, et 
al., 1984). 
 Several factors have been proposed that may affect the development of 
analogical reasoning in children. Piaget and colleagues (Piaget, Montangero and 
Billeter 1977, as described in Goswami, 2001) presented children with item analogy 
tasks, in which a child was first presented with one pair of items, A:A’ and one item B 
taken from a second pair of items. These children were required to complete the 
analogy by selecting the item B’ from a number of alternatives presented to them. The 
correct item B’ held the same relation to item B as item A’ held to item A. For example, 
a child would see two pictures of the first item pair depicting a steering wheel and a 
car, and a picture of one item from the second item pair depicting a handlebar. To 
correctly complete the analogy, children need to select the picture of the bicycle from 
the possible alternatives presented to them. Piaget found that children were able to 
solve these kinds of analogical problems at around eleven to twelve years of age. 
Later, however, Goswami and Brown (1989, 1990) showed that 3- and 4-year-old 
children could also solve such item analogy tasks. These authors employed relations 
that were highly familiar to younger children (i.e., simple causal relations such as 
melting, wetting and cutting, and thematic relations such as “a bird lives in a nest”). 
Given such evidence, Goswami (1991, 2001) has argued that infants are capable of 
analogical reasoning as long as they understand the relations needed to solve the 
analogy task. With increasing age, children gain more knowledge about relations and 
so their performance on analogical reasoning tasks also increases. 
 Gentner and Rattermann (1991) have argued that children undergo a 
“relational shift”; that is, a shift from attending primarily to surface or featural 
similarity when comparing two objects or situations, to attending to the relational 
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similarity. It is readily apparent that children notice the physical similarity between 
objects before they notice the relational similarity between them (Kotovsky & 
Gentner, 1996). Kotovsky and Gentner (1996) have proposed a progressive alignment 
mechanism, where perceiving object similarity improves children’s perception of 
relational similarity. As a result of this, when young children are presented with two 
structures that contain a physically identical item, but this item plays a different 
relational role in each structure (items are cross-mapped), they prefer to map across 
structures on the basis of object match rather than relational match (Loewenstein & 
Gentner, 2005; Paik & Mix, 2006; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998a). For example, if one 
structure depicts a tow-truck pulling a car and the other structure depicts a car pulling 
a trailer, then the car stimuli are cross-mapped – both scenes contain a car, but in one 
scene the car is being pulled and in the other the car is doing the pulling, meaning that 
the car does not share the same relational role in both scenes (Markman & Gentner, 
1990). Precisely when the relational shift occurs depends heavily on knowledge of the 
relevant relations. As such, the relational shift is domain specific (Kotovsky & Gentner, 
1996). However, not only children, also adults tend to initially focus on surface 
features and overall similarity of the two situations, simply because they are easier to 
detect. As a consequence, this discovery of feature similarity leads to comparison, 
which in turn gives them an opportunity to detect relational commonalities between 
items (Christie & Gentner, 2010; Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003, 2004).  
 Halford (Halford, 1999; Halford, et al., 1998), however, has proposed a 
different explanation for developmental changes in analogical reasoning. He argues 
that children’s ability to solve analogies is constricted by their working memory 
capacity. Working memory capacity limits the number of relations children (and adults) 
can process in parallel. The number of relations that need to be compared 
simultaneously represents the relational complexity of a problem, and the higher the 
relational complexity, the higher the memory processing load. He argued that children 
at the age of 2 years old can represent binary relations (i.e., a relation between two 
arguments), but that it is not until 5 years old that they are capable of reasoning about 
relations containing three arguments. Richland et al. (2006) have investigated how 
relational complexity and featural distractors affect 3 to 14 year old children. 
Specifically, they presented children with pairs of pictures that depicted simple 
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relations between objects, such as kiss, chase and feed. One picture, for example, 
would show a dog chasing a cat, which in turn was chasing a mouse. A second picture 
would show a mother chasing a boy, who in turn is chasing a girl. If the second picture 
included a lying cat, for example, then this would represent a featural distractor. The 
authors varied relational complexity by presenting the children with pictures depicting 
either one or two relations. They found that while 3- to 7-year-olds were affected both 
by relational complexity and the presence of a distractor, 13- and 14-year-olds were 
affected only by relational complexity.  
 Language has also been proposed to be one of the key driving forces behind 
the development of analogical reasoning (Loewenstein & Gentner, 1998; Rattermann 
& Gentner, 1998a; Simms & Gentner, 2008). Gentner and Loewenstein (2002, pg. 101), 
for example, have suggested that “The acquisition of relational language influences the 
development of relational thought.” They propose that language represents a tool for 
extracting relations. However, they acknowledge that there are other ways to support 
relational thought apart from language – e.g., maps and diagrams (Loewenstein & 
Gentner, 2005). In contrast, some researchers have argued that relational language 
does not play a particularly important role in the development of analogical reasoning, 
and several studies have not found any direct correlation between relational language 
and relational reasoning (Chen, 2007; Mutafchieva & Kokinov, 2007; Richland, et al., 
2006; Smith, 1984; Spetch & Parent, 2006). One obvious way to assess the importance 
of relational language is to study nonhuman animals and it is to this that I now turn my 
attention. 
 
2.3. Analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates 
 
A number of researchers have focused on whether nonhuman animals without 
language are capable of abstract thought. One of the most heavily studied abstract 
relations in animal research is that of “identity” (or sameness). Somewhat surprisingly, 
perhaps, many primates (e.g., Bovet & Vauclair, 2001; Fagot, et al., 2001; Flemming, et 
al., 2007; Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1990; 
Premack, 1971; Wasserman, Fagot, & Young, 2001; E.A. Wasserman, M. E. Young, & J. 
Fagot, 2001; Wright & Katz, 2006), birds (Pepperberg, 1987; Wasserman, Hugart, & 
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Kirkpatrick-Steger, 1995; Wright & Katz, 2006), dolphins (Mercado, Killebrew, Pack, 
Mácha, & Herman, 2000; Nachtigall & Patterson, 1980) and honeybees (Giurfa, Zhang, 
Jenett, Menzel, & Srinivasan, 2001) were shown to detect relations. However, very few 
individuals have been found to be able to solve analogical reasoning tasks.  
In a seminal study on whether nonhuman primates are capable of reasoning by 
analogy, one of the first subjects to be tested was a language-trained chimpanzee 
named Sarah (Premack, 1983). She was tested for her ability to engage in analogical 
reasoning when presented with item analogy problems (Gillan, et al., 1981; Oden, 
Thompson, & Premack, 2001) and with a relational match-to-sample task (Premack, 
1983; Thompson, et al., 1997). For example, an item analogy problem was presented 
to her on a board in a 2 x 2 matrix, where the stimuli A and A’ exemplified a certain 
relation and the stimuli B and B’ exemplified the same relation, but with different 
items (similar to the example in Figure 1) (Gillan, et al., 1981). She either had to 
complete the analogy by choosing the B’ item from a set of alternatives, or she was 
presented with a completed matrix and had to judge whether the two sides were the 
same or different with respect to the relations they presented. Moreover, the analogy 
problems presented could be 1) figural, in which the stimuli were geometric figures 
and the relations expressed were size, color and marking, or 2) conceptual, in which 
the stimuli were household object, and the relations connecting them were functional 
and spatial. Incredibly, Sarah was successful in all of these tasks. More recently, Oden, 
Thompson, and Premack (2001) presented Sarah with five items that were randomly 
placed in front of her. She arranged them spontaneously in a 2 x 2 matrix, but she did 
not always follow the A:A’ :: B:B’ pattern. The authors noted that her strategy 
appeared to be to match the two pairs in the number of within-pair featural 
differences. She ignored the actual physical nature of those differences, however.  
Oden et al. (2001) argued that Sarah’s own strategy of numerically equating within-
pair featural differences still involves analogical reasoning about relations between 
relations, proposing that Sarah could not only complete analogies, but also construct 
them. They further argued that Sarah’s prior experience with symbols that 
represented the abstract relations of sameness and difference was critical for her to be 
able to explicitly express her reasoning in analogical reasoning tasks. 
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As noted above, the second task through which Sarah’s analogical reasoning 
competence was tested was a relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task. The RMTS task 
has since become one of the most used paradigms to investigate nonhuman animals’ 
reasoning about relations between relations (e.g., Cook & Wasserman, 2007; Fagot & 
Parron, 2010; Fagot, et al., 2001; Flemming, et al., 2008; Thompson, et al., 1997; Vonk, 
2003).  
 
 
Figure 2. An example of a relational match-to-sample task. The sample A consists of two same 
items – therefore the relation it depicts is “identity”. One of the alternatives (B) also consists of 
two items that are the same, whereas the second alternative (C) consists of two items that are 
different. Therefore, the alternative B matches the sample A in the “identity” relation. 
 
In the RMTS task, an individual is required to match one of the alternative 
(choice) stimuli with a sample stimulus on a basis of a common relation. In Figure 2, 
stimulus A represents the sample and stimuli B and C the alternatives. Only one of the 
alternatives (stimulus B) matches the sample in the relation that the items within the 
array exhibit identity. In order to solve the RMTS task, the animal has to recognize the 
relational similarity between the sample and one of the alternatives. Importantly, the 
majority of those nonhumans that have been successful in solving the RTMS paradigm 
are those with a history of symbol training, especially in a symbol for “the same” 
(Premack, 1983; Thompson, et al., 1997). This fact, along with Sarah’s remarkable 
achievements, have led some researchers to conclude that nonhuman animals need 
some kind of symbolic knowledge of relations to be able to reason by analogy 
A 
B C 
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(Flemming, et al., 2008; Premack, 1983; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Thompson, et al., 
1997). However, this view has been challenged by findings showing that several 
subjects with no history of language training, and of different primate and bird species,  
do appear to be capable of solving analogical reasoning tasks (Cook & Wasserman, 
2007; Fagot & Parron, 2010; Fagot, et al., 2001; Haun & Call, 2009; Kennedy & 
Fragaszy, 2008; Vonk, 2003).  
The RMTS paradigm has, however, been criticized by a number of authors who 
have argued that it does not actually test animals’ ability to match relations (Penn, et 
al., 2008). Rather, it could be solved simply by matching the perceptual variability 
between array items (also called “entropy”). For any array of identical objects, the 
perceptual variability will be lower than for arrays of different items, assuming similar 
complexity of the individual objects. Hence, subjects only have to match pairs with 
either low or high perceptual variability to succeed in a RTMS task. This claim has been 
supported by observations that pigeons’ and baboons’ performance on an 
identity/non-identity discrimination task increases with a number of items in an array 
(Wasserman, et al., 2001; Wasserman, Young, & Fagot, 2001). In line of these findings, 
Fagot et al. (2001) have reported that baboons’ performance on the RMTS task also 
increases when the difference between identity and non-identity arrays’ entropy score 
is increased. 
More recently, mapping tasks have been administered to investigate analogical 
reasoning in primates. In these tasks, individuals are unable to rely on perceptual 
similarities between objects to solve the task. In a mapping task, an individual is 
required to find a reward in her set of cups after observing another reward being 
hidden amongst an experimenter’s set. To be successful, an individual has to choose 
the cup in her set that holds the same spatial relation as the baited cup in the 
experimenter’s set. More precisely, they needed to go through several steps. As a first 
step, apes had to recognize the relations between the cups within each array. 
Secondly, they needed to recognize that these relations were the same in both arrays. 
Then they had to define the relation the baited cup held within the array (e.g., it was 
left of the middle and the right cup). And finally, apes needed to find a cup in the other 
array, which held the same relation. In one such study, capuchin monkeys had to map 
the cups from two sets based on their common size relations (Kennedy & Fragaszy, 
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2008). One capuchin monkey was successful in this mapping task, even when a 
distracter cup was present and the two sets of cups differed in color, shape and size. 
Here, the distracter was a cup that was of identical size in both sets, but it did not have 
the same size relation within each set. Importantly, this capuchin went through 
intensive training in matching objects of the same absolute size before it was capable 
of matching objects of different absolute, but of the same relative size. In another 
study along the same lines, Haun and Call (2009)  tested human children, chimpanzees, 
bonobos, orangutans and gorillas on two types of relational reasoning: causal and 
spatial relational reasoning. Apes and children were tested with the same apparatus 
and with a similar amount of training and instructions. Two arrays with three possible 
hiding containers were placed horizontally, one behind the other, on an inclined table. 
In the causal reasoning condition, the cups in the two arrays were connected with 
tubes, whereas in the spatial relational condition they were not. The two arrays 
differed in length, but they were aligned flush left or flush right. As a result, the 
corresponding pairs of cups in the spatial relational condition could be connected by 
three different combinations of strategies: gravity (the corresponding cups were in the 
line of gravity), proximity (the corresponding cups were the closest cups), and same 
relative position (the corresponding cups held the same relation within the arrays). The 
aligned pair could be solved by all three strategies; the middle cup could be solved by 
using the proximity and relative position strategy; and the third cup could be solved 
only by matching the relative position of the cups. The study revealed that when 
subjects needed to reason about causal connectedness of the cups, all five great ape 
species were successful, whereas when reasoning about spatial relational similarity, 
only children of 4 years of age and older, chimpanzees and bonobos, but not gorillas 
and orangutans, were successful. However, children and apes performed above chance 
on the spatial relational task only if they were first confronted with the causal task. It 
appears, therefore, that causal task provided scaffolding for the subsequent relational 
task. 
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3. Parallels in human and nonhuman primates’ analogical reasoning 
 
Based on the above overview of the literature, we can draw some parallels between 
apes’ and children’s analogical reasoning. For children and apes, the ability to detect 
relations precedes the ability to reason about relational similarity (Oden, et al., 1990; 
Tyrrell, et al., 1991). Language (or a symbolic system) appears to facilitate relational 
thought in both young children and apes, but not in monkeys (Flemming, et al., 2007; 
Loewenstein & Gentner, 1998, 2005; Thompson & Oden, 1995). Young children 
perform much better on relational tasks when they are tested with relations that they 
understand (Goswami & Brown, 1989). Similarly, all nonhuman animals that have 
passed analogical reasoning tasks have had some prior training or experience with the 
tested relations (e.g., Fagot, et al., 2001; Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Thompson, et al., 
1997). Moreover, it appears that progression from easier examples to more difficult 
ones helps children and primates to solve the difficult examples (Haun & Call, 2009; 
Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001). In addition, young children 
and primates (and pigeons) rely heavily on perceptual similarity when solving 
analogical reasoning tasks (Fagot, et al., 2001; Paik & Mix, 2006). Haun and Call’s 
(2009) study has shown more specific similarities between chimpanzees’, bonobos’ 
and 4-year-old children’s performance in spatial relational reasoning tasks. 
 Therefore, in the studies that I describe in the following sections, I used a 
relational domain known to children and apes – that of the spatial domain. Apes and 
children have shown comparative spatial cognitive abilities in tasks such as spatial 
memory, object permanence, rotation and transposition (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-
Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007), as well as in a task demanding an ability to reason 
about relational similarity of spatial arrays (Haun & Call, 2009). In addition, in Studies 1 
and 3, mapping tasks varied in overall similarity and difficulty.  
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4. Summary of studies 
 
As highlighted above, most of the studies to date that have assessed analogical 
reasoning in nonhuman animals have used a single paradigm – the relational match-to-
sample task (RMTS) - and have focused on the relation of identity/non-identity. All of 
these RMTS studies have also required that animals have some sort of previous 
experience with either the MTS procedure, or with discrimination of identity/non-
identity relations (Fagot, et al., 2001; Thompson, et al., 1997; Vonk, 2003). It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that the RMTS task has received criticism with regard to 
whether it really does assess relational reasoning, or whether successful animals solve 
it using perceptual cues alone (Penn, et al., 2008). Therefore, the aim of the first study 
outlined below was to investigate great apes’ ability to reason by analogy by 
employing a spatial mapping task that did not require prior training, and where 
animals could not rely on the perceptual similarities to solve it. The results of the first 
study showed that great apes have some rudimentary ability to engage in analogical 
reasoning. However, the results also suggested that the apes might have employed a 
different approach and encoded different type of spatial relations than I expected 
them to. More specifically, the apes appeared to encode the baited cup in relation to a 
nearby landmark, rather than in relation to the other cups present in the array. The 
second study presented here extended the findings of Study 1 by investigating in more 
detail how apes encode the location of a hidden reward. I tested whether apes 
encoded the location of a hidden reward in relation to 1) the other cups present in the 
array – i.e., the relative position of the baited cup within the array; or 2) the landmarks 
surrounding the cups – e.g., the edge of the table. Since most studies on analogical 
reasoning in children have provided them with detailed instructions about where to 
search for a hidden reward, in the third study presented here, I investigated whether 
4- and 5-year-olds - that have previously been shown to be capable of mapping spatial 
relations (Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005) - would spontaneously engage in relational 
mapping, without any explicit instruction to do so. In addition, I was interested to see 
whether children, like apes, would show a constellation-dependent pattern of 
performance, and a preference for mapping between item arrays using landmark cues 
(i.e., the landmark strategy). 
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4.1. Study 1: Great apes’ strategies to map spatial relations (Hribar, et al., 
2011) 
 
Study 1 investigated bonobos’, chimpanzees’ and orangutans’ ability to reason about 
spatial relational similarity. Three spatial mapping tasks were employed in which apes 
were required to find a hidden food reward in an array of three identical-looking cups, 
after observing an experimenter hide a food reward in a different array of three cups. 
To be successful, apes needed to infer the reward’s position in their array of cups 
based on the position of the reward in the experimenter’s array. A similar spatial 
mapping task has already been used to good effect with great apes (Haun & Call, 
2009). Haun and Call (2009) tested apes on two types of relational reasoning – causal 
and spatial relational reasoning. They found that all great ape species were successful 
in a task that required reasoning about causal relations, but that only chimpanzees and 
bonobos, and not orangutans and gorillas, were successful in a task that required 
reasoning about spatial relations. However, the corresponding pairs of cups in the 
spatial relational condition could be connected by three different strategies: gravity, 
proximity and a relational strategy. This means that apes had to pay attention to the 
relational strategy and ignore the other two. Moreover, the authors found an order 
effect for the relational task, finding that those subjects that started with this task 
performed worse than those that were presented with it after the causal task. 
In the first experiment of the present study, two 3-cup arrays (designated the 
Hiding and Search arrays) were placed next to each other, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of apes using gravity or proximity search strategies. Specifically, apes in the 
experimental condition saw the experimenter hide a food reward underneath a cup in 
the Hiding array (baited cup) and had to select the cup from the Search array that was 
located in the same relative position (left, middle or right) as the baited cup. For the 
control condition, the baited cups in the two arrays had different (but consistent) 
relative positions within the array. Consequently, apes had to learn these arbitrary 
pairings in order to be successful. In both conditions, apes could choose twice, once 
from the Search array and once from the Hiding array. This allowed verification that 
apes had paid attention to the baiting of the Hiding array, and that they did not forget 
where the food was hidden.  
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Subjects from both groups found the food reward at above chance levels in the 
Hiding array, but not in the Search array. Their poor performance on the Search array 
could not, therefore, be attributed to them ignoring the baiting event, or forgetting the 
location of the reward in the Hiding array. The results from this first experiment 
provided no evidence that apes applied a relational mapping strategy to find the 
hidden reward, which is not consistent with the data from Haun and Call’s study 
(2009). However, the apes in Haun and Call’s study performed better in their spatial 
relational task following experience with a causal relational task. It seems, then, that 
the causal task helped them to recognize the relational similarity between the arrays 
by, perhaps, providing necessary scaffolding. In addition, the arrays were positioned 
one behind the other, which might have further facilitated relational mapping.  
In the second experiment of Study 1, therefore, I assessed whether arranging 
the two arrays one behind the other would help apes to notice the relational similarity 
between the arrays. Moreover, I was interested to see whether apes would continue 
to recognize that the same relations still hold between the cups when the two arrays 
are moved next to each other. Specifically, they were able to observe the transition of 
the two arrays from being positioned one behind the other to being positioned next to 
each other. Thus, in Experiment 2, there were three conditions: the Two rows 
condition, Transition condition and One line condition. At the start of each trial in all 
three conditions, the two arrays were positioned one behind the other, in perfect 
alignment. First, the Search array (the array closest to the ape) was baited behind an 
occluder. Following baiting, the procedure differed between the three conditions. In 
the Two rows condition, the two arrays stayed in two rows throughout the whole trial 
(i.e., baiting of the Hiding array and allowing apes to choose a cup from the Search 
array). In the Transition condition, the two arrays stayed in two rows during baiting of 
one of the cups in the Hiding array, but before the ape was allowed to choose a cup in 
the Search array, the Hiding array was pushed forward next to the Search array 
(thereby forming a single line). Finally, in the One line condition, the Hiding array was 
first pushed forward next to the Search array, and then the Hiding array was baited 
and the ape allowed to choose. 
As expected, the arrangement of the arrays had an effect on apes’ success. 
Apes’ performance was best in the Two rows condition, then in the Transition 
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condition, and worst in the One line condition. As the apes passed the Two rows and 
Transition conditions, it is clear that they transferred information from the Hiding array 
to infer the reward’s position in the Search array. One plausible strategy that apes may 
have used was to simply pick the cup in the Search array that was closest to the reward 
that they had just seen being hidden (i.e., a proximity bias). This strategy would, of 
course, be unsuccessful in the One line condition. Apes’ success also varied depending 
on the position of the baited cup, being significantly lower when the middle cup was 
baited than when either the left or the right cups were baited.  
Furthermore, I noticed that some individuals in the One line condition might 
have used a ‘mirror’ strategy. In particular, they tended to choose the cup closest to 
the table edge (the Left cup) in the Search array when the cup closest to the other 
table edge (the Right cup) was baited in the Hiding array. Similarly, they tended to 
choose the cup in the middle of the table (the Right cup in the Search array) when the 
cup in the middle of the table (the Left cup) was baited in the Hiding array. This 
strategy was termed a Landmark strategy, due to the assumption that apes were 
mapping the cups with respect to the relations they held to nearby landmarks (i.e., the 
table’s visual boundaries). Indeed, when apes’ choices in the One line condition were 
analyzed, it was found that they selected the cups that adhered to this landmark 
strategy more often than would be expected by chance. 
 In Experiment 3 of Study 1, to investigate whether apes preferred the 
proximity strategy over relational/landmark (both relational and landmark strategy led 
to the same outcome), I placed the arrays in two, misaligned rows (see Figure 3). Due 
to this misalignment, choosing the most proximate cup to the baited cup was not the 
most successful strategy. Indeed, such a strategy would work only one third of the 
time. The results showed that apes found the hidden food reward at above chance 
levels; however, their performance again varied depending on which cup was baited. 
Success rate was highest for the cup where both strategies (relational/landmark and 
proximity) could be used (H1). When the middle cup (H2) was baited, apes 
preferentially chose the closest cup to H2 in the Search array (S1), and when the third 
cup (H3) was baited, chimpanzees and bonobos tended to choose the cup that held 
the same relative position in the Search array - orangutans showed no such 
preference. In conclusion, the results of Experiment 3 could not be explained by 
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proximity-based search strategy alone; neither could they be explained by 
relational/landmark strategy alone.  
 
 
Figure 3. Position of the cups in a. Right side trials and b. Left side trials. The solid arrows show 
which cup in the Search array apes would choose when using the relational similarity between 
cups (spatial relation strategy). The dashed arrows show the cup that apes would choose if 
they just went for the closest cup (proximity strategy). When a reward is hidden under cup H1, 
apes may choose cup S1 using either of the two strategies to find the hidden reward. When 
food is hidden under cups H2 and H3, apes have to use a spatial relation strategy (cups S2 and 
S3 respectively) to find the hidden reward. 
 
The three experiments of Study 1 provide no evidence that apes mapped the 
two arrays of cups on the basis of their relative positions within the arrays. However, 
they ruled out the possibility that apes’ choices were based solely on a proximity 
strategy. Rather, it appears that apes applied a strategy where they mapped together 
the cups with respect to their relations to the table’s boundaries. This strategy 
assumes that apes encoded the baited cup not in a relation to the other cups in the 
array, but with respect to a landmark in the surrounding environment. This means that 
instead of using an intrinsic frame of reference - encoding relations that hold within 
the array - they used an allocentric frame of reference – encoding relations that hold 
between an individual cup and one’s surroundings (Levinson, 2003). In addition, their 
performance was dependent on the position of the baited cup: they performed worst 
when the middle cup was baited, which could be explained by the absence of a 
differential landmark cue next to it. Extending the work of Study 1, and to follow-up on 
Search array 
Hiding array 
  H3          H2          H1 
   S3   S2          S1 
Search array 
  S1  S2  S3 
   H1  H2          H3 
Hiding array 
a.)  b.)  
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some of the assumptions made, Study 2 directly assessed whether apes primarily 
encode the location of a hidden reward in relation to the table’s boundaries. 
 
4.2. Study 2: Great apes use landmark cues over spatial relations to find 
hidden food (Hribar & Call, 2011) 
 
Study 1 showed that apes did not recognize the relational similarity between two 
linear arrays of three identical cups when they were placed side by side, in one line. It 
was proposed that the reason they failed in the task, therefore, was because they 
employed a different encoding strategy. Specifically, rather than encoding the cups as 
the left-most, middle and right-most cups, I proposed that they encoded them as ‘the 
cups situated nearest the table’s edge’, and ‘the cups in the middle of the table’.  
We know from previous studies that primates can successfully find a reward 
that they have seen placed underneath one of several identical, linearly arrayed 
opaque containers (Albiach-Serrano, Call, & Barth, 2010; Barth & Call, 2006; Call, 2001; 
de Blois & Novak, 1994; de Blois, Novak, & Bond, 1998; Deppe, Wright, & Szelistowski, 
2009; Fedor, Skollár, Szerencsy, & Ujhelyi, 2008; Hoffman & Beran, 2006; Mendes & 
Huber, 2004). However, these studies did not investigate the specific cues that 
primates may use to encode the reward’s location. Hoffman and Beran (2006) 
investigated whether chimpanzees used allocentric or egocentric cues when searching 
for food hidden underneath a linear array of 3 or 4 containers. Chimpanzees 
performed worse when they had to walk around an array than when they stayed still, 
suggesting that they primarily use allocentric cues to locate hidden food. Moreover, 
they found that when chimpanzees had to walk around the array, they performed 
worse on the middle cup(s) than when either of the two outer containers was baited. 
These authors suggested that this could be due to the salient features that surrounded 
the outer containers. Therefore, the aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether apes 
encoded the baited cup with respect to its relative position within the array, or with 
respect to its relation to the table’s edge.  
 Three experiments were conducted in which apes could observe the hiding of a 
food reward in an array of three identical cups, which rested on a platform and formed 
a straight line. After the food reward had been hidden, I walked to another panel 
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where I offered the subject a piece of low value food (e.g., carrot). After 30sec, I 
returned to the array and pushed the platform on which the array rested forward so 
that the subject could point through the mesh to their chosen cup. Over the three 
experiments, the position of the cups on the table and the distance between the cups 
was varied. Specifically, in the first experiment the array was placed on the left half of 
the table, such that the Left cup rested near the table’s edge, whereas the Right cup 
rested near the middle of table. Apes’ retrieval accuracy was significantly higher when 
the reward was hidden underneath the Left and the Right cups compared to the 
Middle cup. In Experiment 2, a further condition was added in which the array was 
placed over the whole table, such that both outer cups rested next to the table’s edges 
and the Middle cup rested in the middle of the table. As such, if apes encode the 
baited cup with respect to its relation to a nearby landmark, and they treated the 
edges and the middle of the table as landmarks, then their performance on the Middle 
cup should not differ from their performance on the Left and Right cups. On the other 
hand, if apes encoded the baited cup by its relative position within the array, then the 
performance on the Middle cup should still be lower than on the other two cups. Apes’ 
retrieval accuracy improved significantly when the array was placed over the whole 
table and the Middle cup occupied a position in the middle of the table. Therefore, the 
results support the landmark account of encoding. Moreover, apes’ performance on 
the Right cup, which also now rested at one of the table’s edges, improved. This 
supports the suggestion that, for apes the edges of the table might be more salient 
landmark than the middle of the table.  
In the third experiment, the effects of the distance to the landmarks (i.e., 
table’s edge and the middle of the table) and the distance between the cups were 
investigated. Apes were presented with four conditions, in which I varied the 
positioning of the cups on the table (either on one half of the table or over the whole 
table) and the distance between the cups: 1) Full table-Near condition, 2) Full table-Far 
condition, 3) Half table-Near condition, and 4) Half table-Far condition (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. The positioning of the cups in the four conditions of Experiment 3: a. Full 
table Near, b. Full table Far, c. Half table Near, d. Half table Far. L - Left cup, M - 
Middle cup, R - Right cup, E1 - Edge1 cup, E2 - Edge2 cup.  
 
Apes retrieval accuracy was found to be at above chance levels for all four 
conditions. However, they were more successful in the conditions where the cups 
were further apart (Far conditions) than when they were closer together (Near 
conditions). Hence, the distance between the cups markedly affected apes’ recall. 
Moreover, apes’ success was highest when the reward was hidden underneath an 
outer cup that was placed directly at a table’s edge and lowest when the Middle cup 
hid the reward (no matter its location on the table). This finding suggests that apes 
primarily used the table’s edges as a landmark. Previous studies have shown that the 
edges of a platform or a boundary has an influence on the spatial recall of nonhuman 
animals and humans (Bullens et al., 2010; Cheng & Sherry, 1992; Huttenlocher, 
Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994; Kubo-Kawai & Kawai, 2007). In addition, apes’ poor 
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performance on the Middle cup can be explained by the requirement that one needs 
two relations to encode such. Primates readily use landmark cues to search for hidden 
food (Deipolyi, Santos, & Hauser, 2001; Dolins, 2009; MacDonald, Spetch, Kelly, & 
Cheng, 2004; Menzel, 1996; Potì, 2000; Potì, Bartolommei, & Saporiti, 2005; Potì et al., 
2010; Sutton, Olthof, & Roberts, 2000); however, to use two landmarks cues 
relationally is far more cognitively demanding for primates (MacDonald, et al., 2004; 
Marsh, Spetch, & MacDonald, in press; Potì, et al., 2005; Potì, et al., 2010; Sutton, et 
al., 2000). 
In summary, the results of present three experiments show that apes’ retrieval 
accuracy was affected by two main factors: the distance between the cups and the 
position of the cups in relation to the table’s edges. The larger the distance between 
the cups, the better performance became, and apes’ performance was higher for the 
outer cups than for the middle cup, especially if the outer cups were placed at the 
table’s edges.  
 
 4.3. Study 3: Children’s reasoning about spatial relational similarity: the effect 
of alignment (Hribar, et al., sub.) 
 
Study 1 showed that apes’ mapping ability was affected by the constellation of the 
arrays, and Study 2 confirmed that apes’ choice behavior was driven primarily with 
respect to landmark cues. In Study 3, I shifted my focus to children to assess how 
generalizable the previous results were across species. Specifically, 4- and 5-year-old 
children were presented with a similar spatial mapping task as used with the great 
apes in Study 1. However, the procedure was modified in three ways: First, one group 
of children was rewarded with respect to an aligned mapping strategy between the 
Hiding and Search arrays (Left-Left, Middle-Middle and Right-Right cups), while a 
second group was rewarded with respect to a landmark mapping strategy. The Two 
rows condition could not differentiate between the two mapping strategies, as they 
would both result in choosing of the same cups, due to the fact that the Left cups from 
both the Hiding and Search arrays were also the cups situated at the edges of the table 
in both arrays, for example. The One line condition, on the other hand, could 
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differentiate between the two mapping strategies - the Right cup from the Hiding array 
would map onto the Right cup from the Search array when children were rewarded for 
the aligned mapping, but when they were rewarded for the landmark mapping, the 
Right cup in the Hiding array would map onto the Left cup in the Search array, since 
they were both located at the table’s edges. When the landmark mapping strategy was 
rewarded, however, the Transition condition would lose its purpose of showing that 
the corresponding cups in the Two rows condition were the same as in the One line 
condition. Therefore, the second modification was to omit the Transition condition 
altogether. Finally, I blocked the two conditions and presented them sequentially. Half 
of the children started with the Two rows condition and the other half started with the 
One line condition. This modification allowed me to test for a transfer effect from an 
easier task to a more difficult task. Critically, in order to be able to make the 
comparison between children and apes valid, I gave children only minimal verbal 
instructions. Specifically, they were told only that I will hide some pictures and that 
they will need to search for them. 
 4- and 5-year-old children spontaneously engaged in relational mapping, even 
though they were not explicitly told to do so. They found the hidden picture more 
often in the Two rows condition than in the One line condition. Therefore, it was easier 
for children to recognize relational similarity when the arrays were aligned one behind 
the other than when they were placed next to each other. One reason for this might 
be a higher level of similarity between the arrays in the Two rows condition than in the 
One line condition. When humans compare two spatial scenes (A and B), for example, 
they rate those scenes where B can be changed into A through relatively few changes 
to be more similar than where many changes are required to change B into A (Bruns & 
Egenhofer, 1997). Overall, therefore, it is clear that similarity plays an important role in 
aligning and mapping between scenes (Chen, 1996; Chen, et al., 1997; Holyoak, et al., 
1984; Paik & Mix, 2006). In addition, the perfect alignment of the two arrays in the 
Two rows condition might have also increased children’s mapping success, as children 
could further rely on egocentric cues to solve the task (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Paik & 
Mix, 2008; Vasilyeva & Bowers, 2006). Contrary to results from other studies, which 
reported that children performed better on a more difficult task following experience 
with a simpler task, the experience of successfully mapping relations in the Two rows 
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condition did not increase children’s success in the One line condition. If children 
indeed used egocentric cues instead of relative position in the Two rows condition, 
then these cues were no longer helpful when children were presented with the One 
line condition.  The most interesting finding was that those children rewarded for the 
landmark mapping strategy performed better than those children rewarded for the 
aligned mapping strategy - indeed, some children that were rewarded for the aligned 
mapping strategy actually came to engage in the landmark mapping strategy. It 
appears, therefore, that just like great apes (see Study 1), children at the age of 4 and 5 
years old prefer to employ a landmark strategy over an aligned strategy when engaged 
in a spatial mapping task. These results, then, assume that children also encoded the 
location of the hidden reward in relation to nearby landmarks, rather than in relation 
to the other cups within the array. 
 It is also possible, however, that the children encoded the location of the 
hidden reward in relation to their body position, mapping together those cups that 
were furthest away from them, those that were half way away from them, and those 
that were closest to them. Unfortunately, Study 3 was not able to discriminate 
between these possible encoding and mapping strategies. However, Nardini et al. 
(2006) investigated which cues children use when searching for a hidden toy in an 
array of 12 identical cups. The array was placed on a rotating platform together with a 
number of distinctive landmark cues. The cues employed by children to find the hidden 
toy, therefore, could be related to their own body (egocentric frame of reference), to 
the room (allocentric frame of reference), or to the array’s configuration and nearby 
landmarks (intrinsic frame of reference). They found that while 3- and 4-year-olds used 
body and room cues to find the hidden toy, 5- and 6-year-olds also used cues present 
within the array itself and within the array’s immediate surroundings (i.e., the 
landmarks, the platform’s edges). Therefore, it is highly possible that the children in 
Study 3 preferred to encode the baited cup of the Hiding array with respect to the 
table’s edges, mapping this relation to a cup in the Search array. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Several studies have shown that a variety of nonhuman animals can reason about 
relations (e.g., baboons, Bovet & Vauclair, 2001; bees, Giurfa, et al., 2001; Californian 
sea lions, Kastak & Schusterman, 1994; rhesus monkeys, Katz, et al., 2002; bottlenose 
dolphins, Nachtigall & Patterson, 1980; chimpanzees, Oden, et al., 1990; an African 
gray parrot, Pepperberg, 1987; gorillas and orangutans, Vonk, 2003; pigeons, 
Wasserman, et al., 1995; capuchin monkeys, Wright & Katz, 2006). However, few 
studies have been able to demonstrate that nonhuman animals can also reason about 
relations between relations (pigeons, Cook & Wasserman, 2007; baboons, Fagot & 
Parron, 2010; capuchin monkeys, Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; great apes, Premack, 
1983; Thompson, et al., 1997; Vonk, 2003). It has been postulated that to do such, an 
animal needs to possess some sort of symbolic system that is capable of representing 
the abstract relations available (Premack, 1983). More recently, however, this view has 
been challenged by a number of studies that have demonstrated that nonhuman 
animals, with no knowledge of relational symbols, can solve tasks that require 
analogical reasoning (e.g., Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008). Moreover, traditional paradigm 
to investigate analogical reasoning in animals was the RMTS task; I employed a more 
recent paradigm – a mapping task. The first study presented in this dissertation 
provides additional support for the view that “relational language” is not a prerequisite 
for relational thought. Critically, apes in Study 1 were not trained to pay attention to 
specific parts of the task; instead, I investigated their spontaneous responses. 
Importantly, apes were able to transfer information about a reward’s position in one 
array to a second array, but their ability to do so depended heavily on the constellation 
of the arrays and the relative position of the baited cup. I proposed that the reason for 
this was that apes did not encode the relative location of the baited cup in the array, 
but rather its location in relation to the nearest landmark (e.g., a table edge). 
Subsequently, therefore, they searched under the cup in the Search array that held the 
same relation to that landmark. Study 2 confirmed this assumption that apes encoded 
the location of the baited cup in terms of its relationship to a nearby landmark and not 
with respect to the other cups in the array: Apes’ performance was highest for the cup 
closest to the table edge and lowest for the middle cup. In addition, reducing the 
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distance between the cups substantially reduced apes’ retrieval accuracy. Finally, in 
Study 3, I presented children with a mapping task, which was very similar to the one 
from Study 1. Furthermore, children were not provided with any verbal instruction, 
thus I was able to compare children’s and apes’ performance into more detail. Study 3 
has provided very similar results to Study 1: children’s mapping performance was 
higher, when the two arrays were aligned one behind the other, than when they were 
lying next to each other, extending the earlier findings from apes that the alignment 
and as such the overall similarity of the arrays promoted relational mapping. A second 
important finding was that children, like apes, did not appear to encode and map the 
relative position of the baited cup across the two arrays. And therefore it is likely that 
children employed the same mapping strategy as apes - the landmark mapping; 
however, other possible strategies cannot, as yet, be ruled out.  
 In conclusion, the present dissertation provides additional support for the view 
that nonhuman primates, without any symbolic knowledge, have the capacity to 
perform the cognitively complex skill of aligning and transferring relations when 
engaged in an analogy task. Moreover, the work presented here highlights the 
intriguing parallels that are present when comparing apes’ and children’s reasoning 
about spatial relational similarity. 
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Abstract We investigated reasoning about spatial rela-
tional similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees,
bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three
spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a
reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward
being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a
food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the
same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in
the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation
of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed
next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the
positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed
either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each
other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two
arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two
rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes com-
pared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar
in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping
the left–left, middle–middle, and right–right cups from
each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar
relations to nearby landmarks (table’s visual boundaries).
Keywords Relational similarity  Spatial cognition 
Analogy  Landmark
Introduction
When humans learn about new phenomena, solve novel
problems, and construct and reconstruct their knowledge,
they more often than not rely on forms of analogical rea-
soning (Gentner 2003; Leech et al. 2008). Often, humans
use analogies to make complex structures intellectually
more accessible for themselves and others. For example,
the analogy of the solar system can be used to explain the
less well-known structure of an atom. In order to form or
understand this analogy, one has to recognize the relational
(structural) similarity between two domains—objects cir-
cling around a central object because of a certain force—
and then needs to map the elements from one domain
(a base) to another (a target)—sun maps to nucleus and
planets map to electrons. Additionally, analogies play a
central role in language acquisition (Tomasello 2003)
and other human cognitive achievements, such as induc-
tive inference (Holland et al. 1986) and categorization
(Ramscar and Pain 1996). This central role in many human
cognitive abilities raises the question of whether the ability
to recognize and respond to abstract relations between
relations might be especially pronounced in humans (Penn
et al. 2008), or indeed be the ‘‘thing that makes us smart’’
(Gentner 2003).
The question then becomes, are nonhuman animals
capable of analogical reasoning—reasoning about relations
between relations? Primates and birds have been shown to
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be capable of reasoning about one relation between
items—called ‘‘first-order relations’’ (e.g. Bovet and
Vauclair 2001; Flemming et al. 2007; Pepperberg 1987;
Vonk 2003; Wright and Katz 2006). However, to be capable
of analogical thinking animal would need to be capable of
reasoning about the relation between two relations—called
‘‘second-order relations’’. If an animal is efficient in rec-
ognizing first-order relation, it does not automatically mean
that she will be able to solve a task that demands reasoning
about second-order relations (Flemming et al. 2007). In
attempts to answer the above question, most studies have
used a so-called relational match-to-sample task (RMTS)
(i.e., chimpanzees: Flemming et al. 2008; Thompson et al.
1997; orangutans and gorillas: Vonk 2003; capuchin
monkeys: Spinozzi et al. 2004; rhesus monkeys: Flemming
et al. 2007, 2008; Guinea baboons: De´py et al. 1999; Fagot
et al. 2001; Fagot and Parron 2010; pigeons: Cook and
Wasserman 2007). In the RMTS task, a subject is first
presented with a sample consisting of a pair of, for
example, identical objects. Then she is presented with two
alternative pairs of objects to match to the sample. One of
the alternatives matches the sample in the relation between
the paired objects (i.e. two identical). In order to solve the
RMTS task, the animal has to recognize the relation
between the objects in the sample (i.e. sameness) and then
find a matching pair that holds the same relation between
them (i.e. again sameness); hence, she has to reason about
and compare two relations. Given its clear structure and
wide applicability across species, RMTS has made a
valuable contribution toward understanding nonhuman’s
reasoning about relations between relations. However,
since all of RMTS studies have used identity/nonidentity
relation, they have been criticized by some authors who
have suggested that they do not test animals’ ability to
recognize and match abstract relations (Penn et al. 2008).
Rather, these authors have argued that they could be solved
by matching the amount of perceptual variability (entropy)
that is depicted in the stimulus arrays (Fagot et al. 2001).
For an array with identical objects, the entropy score will
be zero and therefore lower than for a nonidentity array
(the entropy for two-item array is 1, for 4-items is 2, etc.,
Fagot et al. 2001)—so subjects only have to pick an
alternative array that also has low (or high) entropy.
Evidence to support this has come from observations that
when the difference between identity and nonidentity
arrays’ entropy scores is increased (by increasing the
number of items in an array), animal’s performance on
RMTS also increases (Fagot et al. 2001).
Moreover, all studies using RMTS require long training
periods (i.e. Cook and Wasserman 2007; Fagot et al. 2001)
or subjects that have already had experience in the MTS
procedure (i.e. Vonk 2003), or in discriminating the iden-
tity arrays from nonidentity arrays (i.e. Fagot et al. 2001;
Thompson et al. 1997). Even for children, RMTS appears
to be rather difficult (Christie and Gentner 2007; Thibaut
et al. 2008). Children are able to recognize and match
relations in a RMTS task, which is similar to those pre-
sented to animals, only at the age of 8 years (Thibaut et al.
2008), even though at around the third year of life they are
already able to reason about relational similarity (depend-
ing on the complexity and familiarity of the relations) (i.e.
Chen 2007; Goswami 1995; Goswami and Brown 1990;
Rattermann and Gentner 1998).
Given these criticisms of a traditional RMTS and the
amount of training required in the RMTS paradigm, in the
present study we wanted to investigate apes’ ability to
reason by analogy using a simpler paradigm in which no
training is involved, and where apes are unable to rely on
the perceptual similarities between objects to solve it. To
this end, we employed a searching task in which apes had
to locate a food reward in one array of cups after observing
a food reward being hidden in a different, identical array of
cups. To locate the food reward, apes needed to infer its
position based on the position of the reward in the other
array. More precisely, when a reward was hidden under-
neath the left cup, for example, apes first needed to rec-
ognize that in both arrays each of the three cups held a
special relation to the other two cups, e.g. the left cup was
left of both other two cups. Finally, they needed to select a
cup from their array, which held the same relative position
within the array as the baited cup in the other array. Our
intention was not to train apes to pay attention to specific
parts of the task; instead, we wanted to know whether apes
spontaneously recognized that the reward was always
located in the same relative position in both arrays.
We decided to use such a spatial relational paradigm for
two main reasons. Firstly because spatial tasks come rather
naturally to great apes thus tapping into a sophisticated set
of cognitive abilities that largely match those of humans
(Herrmann et al. 2007). Secondly, setups for spatial tasks
are simple and require no training and they can be used
with a large variety of species.
A similar searching task using spatial relations has
previously been used with human children (Haun and Call
2009; Loewenstein and Gentner 2005) and apes (Haun and
Call 2009). In Loewenstein and Gentner’s (2005) study, for
example, two boxes were vertically arranged that had three
possible hiding places for a reward (on the top, in the
middle and on the bottom). Children observed the experi-
menter hide a reward at a given location in the Hiding box
and were subsequently asked to search for the same reward
in the Finding box. Even the youngest group of children
(mean age: 3.8 years) performed at above chance levels,
indicating that they found the reward by mapping its cor-
responding relative location from the Hiding box to the
Finding box.
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Haun and Call (2009) conducted a similar searching task
with children and with four great ape species (chimpan-
zees, bonobos, orangutans and gorillas). Again, two arrays
with three possible hiding places were used, but here the
arrays were placed horizontally, one behind the other but
misaligned on an inclined table. Additionally, two levels of
relational reasoning were tested: causal and abstract spatial
relational reasoning (most subjects were tested on both
conditions). In the causal condition, the cups in the two
arrays were connected with tubes down which a grape
could roll from one cup to another. In the spatial relations
condition, the two arrays of cups were ‘‘connected’’ by the
spatial relational similarity between the arrays, that is,
when the left cup in one array was baited, then the subject
had to search under the left cup in the other array. Since
one of the two arrays was positioned in front of the other on
an inclined table, there were three possible strategies that
apes could use (for detailed explanation see Haun and Call
2009, p. 150): (1) relational strategy (pick the cup that has
the same spatial relations to the other cups within its
respective array, as the baited cup in the other array) that
led to a success in 100% of time, (2) proximity strategy
(pick the closest cup to the baited cup) producing a 66%
correct choices, and (3) gravity strategy (pick the cup that
is in the line of gravity from the baited cup) that produced
33% correct choices. Their results showed that all four
species of great ape and human children could reason about
the causal connectedness of the cups, but only older chil-
dren (4–4.5 years), chimpanzees and bonobos showed
evidence of reasoning about the spatial relational similar-
ities between the two arrays of cups. However, since there
were three possible strategies to use, it might be harder for
apes to pay attention only to the relational strategy and
ignore the other two.
In the present study, therefore, we sought to further
explore the spatial relational reasoning in our closest living
relatives, the other great apes. In Experiment 1, there were
two main modifications compared to Haun and Call’s
study. First, the two 3-cup arrays were placed on a flat table
instead of an inclined one, and therefore a possibility of
gravity bias was eliminated. Second, the two arrays were
positioned next to each other forming a line, and therefore
all three cups could be solved only by using the relational
strategy. In Experiment 2, we further addressed the issue of
flexibility in spatial relational mapping, by altering the
constellation of the two arrays of cups. Specifically, these
arrays were either placed next to each other, forming a line,
or were aligned perfectly one behind the other. In Exper-
iment 3, we investigated an effect of proximity bias on
apes’ relational mapping ability.
Although in all three experiments apes were rewarded
only when they chose the spatially relationally equivalent
cup in the Search array to the baited cup in the Hiding
array, we noticed that when in Experiment 2 the two
arrays were placed next to each other forming a line,
some individuals might have used a different strategy. In
particular, apes seemed to select the cup at the table edge
(L cup) in the Search array when the cup at the other table
edge (R cup) was baited in the Hiding array. Additionally,
they chose the cup in the middle of the table (R cup) in
the Search array when the cup in the middle of the table
(L cup) was baited in the Hiding array (see Fig. 1c for
better understanding). Because we suspected that the apes
were mapping together the cups that were placed next to
the same landmark (i.e. table’s visual boundary), we
called this strategy a ‘‘landmark strategy’’. Therefore in
the first two experiments, where the two arrays were
positioned next to each other in one line, we additionally
assessed whether the apes tended to choose the cups after
this strategy.
Searching array Hiding array
(b) 
L     M  R L     M  R
Searching array
Hiding array
L M R
L M  R 
(a)
Searching array Hiding array
(c) 
L     M  R L     M  R
Fig. 1 Position of the two arrays for a Two rows, b Transition and
c One line conditions in Experiment 2
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Experiment 1: retrieving and searching
Prior to Experiment 1 we conducted a pilot study with three
15-year-old chimpanzees. The procedure was almost
identical to the procedure of Exp 1 except that the chim-
panzees were allowed to choose only from the Search
array. Results showed that none of the chimpanzees was
able to select the baited cup at above chance levels. A
number of possible explanations exist for this outcome:
First, apes may simply not possess the necessary cognitive
requisites that are required to appreciate the spatial rela-
tions that would lead to successful responding in our task.
It is also possible, however, that subjects simply did not
pay attention to the baiting of the Hiding array because
they never got to choose from it. Failing to take this
information into account would have prevented them from
solving the task. In Experiment 1, therefore, we sought
confirmation that apes had successfully encoded the initial
hiding information by letting them choose both from the
Hiding and Search arrays.
Methods
Subjects
Five bonobos (Pan paniscus), three males and two females,
aged between 11 and 26 years, housed at the Wolfgang
Ko¨hler Primate Research Center, Zoo Leipzig, Germany
participated in this study. Their exact ages at the time of the
study and their rearing histories are shown in Table 1. The
bonobos live in a group with their conspecifics with access
to spacious indoor and outdoor areas. They are fed a
variety of fruits, vegetables, and cereals several times per
day. They are never food deprived and water is available
ad libitum. Subjects were tested individually in their
sleeping rooms. All subjects had previously participated in
a study that involved recognizing spatial relational simi-
larity (Haun and Call 2009).
Materials
We used two arrays of three identical round blue cups
(d = 8 cm) placed next to each other to form a straight
line. Each array was placed on a blue tray (32 cm 9
13 cm). The two trays rested side by side on a table
(80 9 35 cm), separated by a distance of 5 cm and a 5-cm-
high gray plastic divider. The distance between the cups on
each tray was ca. 3.5 cm.
Procedure
One of the arrays was designated as the Search array and
the other as the Hiding array. At the beginning of each trial,
an occluder was raised and a grape was hidden underneath
one of the cups in the Search array. The occluder was then
removed and one of the cups in the Hiding array was baited
in full view of the ape. After baiting was completed, we
allowed subjects to choose twice, once from the Search
Table 1 Details of the apes
tested in this study, the
experiments in which each
subject participated and the
starting condition in Haun and
Call’s study (2009)
P pilot study
a These three subjects were
presented only with the
relational task
Name Age (years) Sex Rearing history Experiment
participation
Start condition
in H&C’s study
Chimpanzees
Jahaga 15 Female Mother P, 2, 3 Relationala
Fifi 15 Female Mother P, 2, 3 Relationala
Trudi 15 Female Mother P, 2, 3 Relationala
Alex 7 Male Nursery 2, 3 Relational
Annett 9 Female Nursery 2, 3 Causal
Alexandra 9 Female Nursery 2, 3 Relational
Bonobos
Joey 26 Male Nursery 1, 2, 3 Relational
Limbuko 13 Male Nursery 1, 2, 3 Causal
Kuno 12 Male Nursery 1, 2, 3 Causal
Ulindi 15 Female Mother 1, 2, 3 Causal
Yasa 11 Female Mother 1, 2, 3 Relational
Orangutans
Bimbo 28 Male Nursery 2, 3 Causal
Dunja 35 Female Nursery 2, 3
Pini 20 Female Mother 2, 3 Causal
Dokana 19 Female Mother 2, 3 Relational
Padana 11 Female Mother 2, 3 Relational
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array and once from the Hiding array. Three subjects chose
first from the Search array and then from the Hiding array
(Search first group); two subjects chose first from the
Hiding array and then from the Search array (Retrieve first
group). We counterbalanced the order of the selected arrays
to investigate whether choosing first from the Hiding array,
where the apes knew where the reward is, might increase
the success of finding a reward in the Search array. We had
two reasons to expect this: first, the apes would not be
distracted by the ‘‘known’’ reward in the Hiding array
when they chose from the Search array. Second, the apes
might perseverate in choosing the same cup in the Search
array as they had just chosen in the Hiding array.
We tested two relation conditions: Relative condition:
The baited cups in the two arrays had the same relative
position within the array. Thus, if the baited cup in the
Hiding array was left, middle or right, then the baited cup
in Search array was left, middle or right, respectively.
Arbitrary condition (control): The baited cups in the two
arrays had different (but consistent) relative positions
within the array. In particular, if the baited cup in the
Hiding array was left, middle or right, then the baited cup
in Search array was right, left or middle, respectively.
Although these three pairs of positions were arbitrary, they
remained the same throughout testing. Consequently, apes
could potentially learn these contingencies over time.
Two bonobos were in a relative condition and three were
in an arbitrary condition (see Table 2). Fifteen 12-trial
sessions were conducted with each subject.
Scoring and data analysis
We videotaped all trials and scored them both live and
from the videotapes. A second coder scored 20% of the
trials to assess inter-observer reliability. Inter-observer
reliabilities for the Search array (Cohen’s kappa = 0.74)
and Hiding array (Cohen’s kappa = 0.82) were good. Our
independent variables were relation condition (Relative
and Arbitrary) and order of selection (Search first and
Retrieve first), and the dependent measure was the per-
centage of correct trials (i.e., those trials on which apes
chose the cup that led to a food reward). A Binomial test
was used to determine whether subjects selected the baited
cup above chance levels. We also investigated whether
subjects may have used the landmark strategy. For this
analysis, we scored whether the apes selected the cups as
follows: when the Right cup (that was located by the
table’s edge) in the Hiding array was baited, the Left cup in
the Search array counted as the correct choice; when the
Middle cup was baited, also the Middle cup in the other
array was correct; and finally, when the Left cup (in the
middle of the table) in the Hiding array was baited, the
Right cup (also in the middle of the table) in the Search
array was considered correct based on the landmark
strategy.
Results
Table 2 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
subject as a function of relation condition and order of
selection. All subjects found the reward at above chance
levels in the Hiding array (Binomial test: P \ 0.001 in all
cases) both when it was searched first (99.5% of trials) and
second (75.3% of trials). In contrast, subjects failed to find
the reward at above chance levels in the Search array
(Binomial test: P [ 0.05 in all cases) regardless of whether
they searched the Search array first (32.5% of trials) or
second (32.5% of trials). The bonobos also did not choose
cups after the landmark strategy at above chance levels,
neither at the group level (Wilcoxon test: z = 0.135,
P = 1.00, N = 5) nor at the individual level (all P [ 0.05).
Discussion
Overall, the results from Experiment 1 do not provide any
evidence that apes applied a relational mapping strategy in
our task. Neither did they use the landmark strategy, which
is not surprising given that the bonobos were never
rewarded for it. Critically, their poor performance was not
a product of them simply not paying attention to the Hiding
array, or due to forgetting about where the reward was
hidden in the Hiding array. Contrasting the data with pre-
vious reports (Haun and Call 2009), it seems that posi-
tioning the two arrays of cups next to each other made it
too difficult for apes to recognize the relational common-
alities between them. One possible explanation could be
that apes did not know what they should do. The connec-
tion between the two arrays was established only through
Table 2 Individual
performances in Experiment 1
Name Relation
condition
Group Retrieve %
correct
P Search %
correct
P
Limbuko Relative Retrieve first 99 \0.001 32 0.35
Joey Relative Search first 88 \0.001 34 0.46
Kuno Arbitrary Retrieve first 100 \0.001 33 0.52
Ulindi Arbitrary Search first 70 \0.001 32 0.41
Yasa Arbitrary Search first 68 \0.001 31 0.26
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the experimenter, who hid the two grapes under the two
cups in the same position. When children are presented
with a searching task the experimenter explains them that
they should search under the same cup or in the same
position (e.g. Loewenstein and Gentner 2005). In addition,
maybe one needs to recognize that one array represents (or
provides information about) the other array (DeLoache
2004). However, in Haun and Call’s study (2009) children
and apes did not get any instructions where they should
look for the reward. They had to figure out the rule ‘‘search
under the cup in the same relative position’’ by themselves.
However, children and apes performed better in the rela-
tional task, if they were first confronted with the causal task
than if they started with the relational task and then went
on to causal task. It seems that causal task provided some
sort of scaffolding to the children and apes or helped them
to recognize that the cups from the two sets were ‘‘con-
nected’’ in some way. Similarly one capuchin monkey that
was able to match size relations in a similar searching task
was first provided with intensive training in matching to
sample task and went through a series of steps before it was
capable of solving an analogy task (Kennedy and Fragaszy
2008). Therefore, in Experiment 2 we tried to make the
relational similarity between the two arrays more obvious
for the apes.
Experiment 2: two rows
In Experiment 2, we sought to test whether arranging the
two arrays one behind the other would allow apes to solve
the spatial mapping task. That is, would this particular
constellation of arrays allow apes to comprehend the sim-
ilarity between the Hiding array and the Search array—in
that they both have three cups (a left cup, a middle cup and
a right cup)—and, as such, enable them to appreciate that
the cups that share the same relationally equivalent location
will always contain the food reward? Moreover, this
information may help apes realize that the same is true
when the two arrays are positioned side by side, in a
straight line. Critically, then, in Experiment 2 apes were
able to observe the transition of the two arrays from being
positioned one behind the other to being positioned next to
each other, forming a straight line. In addition, the Arbi-
trary condition from the Exp 1 was dropped and the apes
could choose only from the Search array.
Methods
Subjects
Six chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), five bonobos (Pan
paniscus) and five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) housed at
the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center, Zoo
Leipzig, Germany participated in this study. There were 11
females and 5 males ranging from 7 to 35 years of age.
Their ages at the time of the study and their rearing his-
tories are shown in Table 1. All apes lived in social groups
of various sizes, with access to big indoor and outdoor
areas. They were fed several times a day and were not food
or water deprived for testing. Each ape was tested indi-
vidually in their sleeping room. Three of the chimpanzees
participated in the pilot study and all of the bonobos par-
ticipated in the Exp 1. In a way they could be considered
experienced subjects, even though they all had failed the
previous tasks. Moreover, all subjects had participated in a
variety of cognitive tests, and all but one individual
(orangutan Dunja) had previously participated in Haun and
Call’s (2009) study.
Materials
As for Experiment 1, we used two arrays of three identical
plastic cups (8 cm 9 8 cm) that were placed on two blue
trays (30 cm 9 14 cm) and situated on a testing table
(80 cm 9 35 cm). The cups were different in color, shape
and size from those used in Experiments 1. The distance
between the cups within each array was ca. 3.5 cm.
Procedure
Both trays, with their respective 3-cup arrays, were placed
on the testing table with the Hiding array located approx-
imately 5 cm behind the Search array (see Fig. 1). At the
beginning of each trial, an occluder was raised so that apes
could not observe the hiding of a food reward underneath
one of the cups in the Search array. Following baiting, the
occluder was removed and the three cups in the Search
array were turned upside down, while the cups in the
Hiding array were still lying on their sides. Then the fol-
lowing three conditions were administered:
1. Two rows condition: One of the cups in the Hiding
array—a cup that had the same relative position within
the array as the baited cup in the Searching array—was
baited in full view of the ape and all three cups were then
upturned. Subsequently, the tray with the Search array
was pushed forward and the ape could make her choice.
2. Transition condition: The baiting of the Hiding array
was identical to the previous condition, but before
subjects were allowed to pick a cup from the Search
array, the Hiding array was moved next to the Search
array, forming a straight line. The Search array was
then pushed forward (and the straight line that the
arrays formed was broken) so that the subject could
choose a cup.
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3. One line condition: Initially, the Hiding array was
moved next to the Search array, forming a straight line.
Following this, one cup from the Hiding array was
baited in full view of the ape, and then the Search array
was pushed forward.
After the subject made her choice, the experimenter
lifted the chosen cup. If it was the correct one, the ape was
immediately given the grape hidden underneath it. If she
was wrong, the experimenter lifted the correct cup and took
away the grape before the next trial was administered.
Apes occasionally pointed to the cups in the Hiding array;
when this happened, they were ignored and encouraged to
choose a cup from the Search array by moving it back and
forward again. One session consisted of 18 trials (6 trials
per condition). The order of trials (conditions), as well as
the position of the food reward, was semi-randomized,
allowing for the constraint that the same condition and
position of the food reward could only occur twice in a
row. Each subject received 15 sessions (creating a total of
90 trials per condition).
Data scoring and analysis
We videotaped all trials and scored them both live and
from the videotapes. A second coder scored 20% of the
trials to assess inter-observer reliability. Inter-observer
reliability was excellent (Cohen’s kappa = 0.97). The
same scoring procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. That
is, we analyzed the percentage of correct choices made in
the Search array, split as a function of species and condi-
tion. We also investigated whether subjects may have used
the landmark strategy.
Additionally, in the Transition condition, apes some-
times pointed to a cup in the Hiding array after they
were moved forward and next to the Search array. Given
this, we also analyzed how often apes pointed correctly
to the baited cup in the Hiding array, and whether this
behavior varied depending on the position of the baited
cup. Since they were never rewarded for pointing to the
Hiding array, this behavior decreased across sessions;
therefore, we only analyzed the first two sessions in this
case.
Results
Success
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct trials as a function
of condition and species. As there were no significant differ-
ences in performance between species in any of the three
conditions (Kruskal–Wallis test: Two rows condition:
v2 = 3.897, P [ 0.05, df = 2, N = 16; Transition condition:
v2 = 2.363, P [ 0.05, df = 2 N = 16; One line condition:
v2 = 0.495, P [ 0.05, df = 2, N = 16), we collapsed the
data across species for further analyses. Collapsing the data in
this way revealed that apes chose the cup in the Search array
that was in the same relative position to the baited cup in the
Hiding array significantly above chance in the Two rows
condition (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.521, P = 0.001, N = 16)
and the Transition condition (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.260,
P = 0.001, N = 16). In contrast, subjects’ performance was
significantly below chance levels in the One line condition
(z = 2.434, P = 0.015, N = 16). Interestingly, we found no
evidence that subjects’ performance changed across sessions
for any species in any of the conditions except for the
orangutans, who improved their performance in the Transition
condition as testing progressed (Spearman: r = 0.551,
P = 0.03).
Overall, we found a significant difference between
conditions (Friedman test: v2 = 28.5, P \ 0.001, df = 2,
N = 16). Post hoc tests revealed that apes performed better
in the Two rows condition than in both the Transition and
One line conditions (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.362, P = 0.001,
N = 16, and, z = 3.519, P \ 0.001, N = 16, respectively).
Apes also performed better in the Transition condition than
in the One line condition (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.518,
P \ 0.001, N = 16).
Individual analyses revealed that all apes, except one
chimpanzee (Jahaga, 42%, P = 0.057), selected the baited
cup in the Search array at above chance levels in the Two
rows condition (Binomial test: all P \ 0.02). Similarly,
three chimpanzees—Jahaga, Alexandra, Annett (Binomial
test, P \ 0.031), one bonobo—Yasa (P \ 0.001) and three
orangutans—Padana, Dunja, Bimbo (P \ 0.003) selected
the baited cup in the Search array at above chance levels in
the Transition condition. In contrast, none of the apes were
above chance at picking the baited cup in the Search array
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Fig. 2 Experiment 2. Species’ mean percent correct for the three
conditions. All three species performed at above chance level on
conditions Two rows and Transition
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in the One line condition; in fact, two chimpanzees and one
bonobo chose the correct (baited) cup at significantly
below chance levels (Binomial test: P \ 0.02).
Analysis of whether apes’ success varied depending on
the position of the cup that was baited revealed that there
was a significant difference in apes’ performance on the
three cups (left, middle or right cup) in all conditions
(Friedman test: Two rows condition: v2 = 11.65, P =
0.003, df = 2, N = 16; Transition condition: v2 = 11.65,
P = 0.003, df = 2, N = 16; One line condition: v2 =
10.38, P = 0.006, df = 2, N = 16). Specifically, apes’
performance when the middle cup was baited was signifi-
cantly lower than when either the left or right cup was
baited in the Two rows condition (Wilcoxon test: left-
middle cup, z = 2.692, P = 0.007, N = 16; right-middle
cup, z = 2.975, P = 0.003, N = 16) and the Transition
condition (Wilcoxon test: left-middle cup, z = 2.225,
P = 0.026, N = 16; right-middle cup, z = 3.032, P =
0.002, N = 16). Apes’ performance when the middle cup
was baited was also significantly lower than when the right
cup was baited in the One line condition (Wilcoxon test:
z = 2.388, P = 0.017, N = 16).
In the first two sessions of the Transition condition,
chimpanzees pointed to the Hiding cup that contained
the food reward in 85% of cases, bonobos in 93% of
cases, and orangutans in 65% of cases, irrespective
of the position of the baited cup (Friedman test:
v2 = 2.923, P = 0.407, df = 2, N = 10). As such, the
differences found between apes’ correct choice behavior
to the middle cup and the other two cups in the Search
array cannot be explained simply as a product of apes
ignoring the middle cup during baiting of the Hiding
array: apes could remember which cup the reward had
been hidden underneath in the Hiding array, and they
could successfully point to it (even when the middle cup
was baited).
Landmark strategy?
In the Two rows and the Transition condition the landmark
strategy would lead subjects to chose the same cups as the
relational strategy. However, in the One line condition the
two strategies would lead to different cups. Therefore, we
only analyzed the choices for the One line condition.
Indeed, in the One line condition, apes preferred to choose
the cup in the Search array that occupied the similar
position on the table as the baited cup in the Hiding array
(Wilcoxon test: z = 3.054, P = 0.002, N = 16). Individual
analyses revealed that two chimpanzees—Alex, Alexandra
(Binomial test, P \ 0.02), one bonobo—Ulindi (P = 0.019)
and one orangutan—Pini (P = 0.011) selected the cup in the
Search array after the landmark strategy at above chance
levels in the One line condition.
Discussion
As expected, the positioning of the two arrays had a strong
influence on ape’s performance. Their success was highest
in the Two rows condition and lowest in the One line
condition.
Although we cannot know for sure what the apes
understood about the goal of the task, passing the Two
rows condition indicated that the apes did use some kind of
information from the Hiding array to infer reward’s posi-
tion in the Search array. However, it appeared they did so
only in the Two rows and Transition condition and not in
the One line condition. One possible explanation for these
results could be that apes did not spontaneously recognize
the stability of spatial relations between the two arrays
when they were moved. A second possible explanation,
however, is that apes did not recognize the relational
similarity between the two arrays, no matter what the
constellation of the arrays was. Rather, perhaps apes sim-
ply employed a strategy in which they picked the closest
cup to the reward (proximity strategy). In order to employ
such a proximity strategy, an ape would only need to be
able to compare the distances between the baited cup in the
Hiding array and the three cups offered in the Search array,
and then choose the cup that was the shortest distance from
the baited cup. In the Two rows condition, the closest cup
was the cup that was directly in front of the baited cup. In
the One line condition, the closest cup was always the same
cup, the right cup, irrespective of the position of the baited
cup in the Hiding array. In the Transition condition, how-
ever, apes would need to remember which cup was in front
of the baited cup before the Hiding array was moved and
ignore the real position of the reward when making their
choice.
A detailed analysis of apes’ choices revealed that even
though the above proximity-based explanation can explain
some of the results it can not explain all of them. In the first
two conditions, apes only reliably chose the most proxi-
mate cup when the baited cup was on the left- or right-hand
side of the Hiding array, but not when it was in the middle
of the array. Moreover, in the One line condition, apes did
not preferentially choose the most proximate cup; however,
neither were their choices entirely random. Rather, it appears
that, in this condition, they were employing the ‘‘landmark’’
strategy. Thus, when the cup at the edge was baited in the
Hiding array (R cup), apes tended to choose the cup at the
edge (L cup) in the Search array, for example.
Given that the three ‘‘pilot’’ chimpanzees and the
bonobos did not perform any better then the rest of the
subjects, we have no reason to believe that their experience
modified the way they tackled the task of Experiment 2.
Although we do not fully dismiss the ‘‘proximity’’
explanation of the results (we test it in Experiment 3), the
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above analysis suggests that apes were mapping the cups of
the Hiding array to the cups of the Search array, but they
were employing a different strategy than we expected them
to in this mapping—the landmark strategy. The possible
explanations for why apes employed a different strategy to
the one we expected will be discussed in the General
Discussion.
Experiment 3: misaligned rows
To investigate apes’ bias to engage in a proximity-based
mapping strategy, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were
positioned in two rows, but were misaligned, such that the
center cup in the Hiding array was positioned behind the
right or the left cup in the Search array. With this con-
stellation, we sought to examine directly whether apes
would preferentially engage in a proximity-based strategy
or a relationally based strategy.
Methods
Subjects
Subjects were the same as those in Experiment 2.
Materials
The same testing table, blue trays, food reward and six cups
used in Experiment 2 were used here. The distance
between the cups within each array was 8 cm.
Procedure
The two arrays of cups were positioned one behind the
other, but misaligned, such that the center cup in the Hiding
array was aligned with either the right or left cup in the
Search array (see Fig. 3). The distance between the blue
trays (upon which the arrays of cups sat) was 15 cm. The
general procedure was the same as in the Two rows con-
dition of Experiment 2. That is, apes did not see the hiding
of the food reward in the Search array, but they did watch a
grape being hidden underneath one of the cups in the
Hiding array. Subsequently, the Search array was pushed
forward, and the subject could make her choice. Two
12-trial sessions were conducted. Within each session, the
Hiding array was misaligned to the left in half of the trials
and to the right in the other half of the trials. The trials
were semi-random, with the constraint that there could be a
maximum of two consecutive trials in which the Hiding
array was misaligned to the same side of the Search array.
Data scoring and analysis
We videotaped all trials and scored them both live and
from the videotapes. A second coder scored 20% of the
trials to assess inter-observer reliability. Inter-observer
reliability was perfect (Cohen’s kappa = 1). The same
scoring procedure used in the previous experiments was
employed. We analyzed both correct choices and choices
irrespective of success, as a function of species and cup
position. We investigated whether the apes chose the cups
following the proximity strategy. We made no extra anal-
ysis for the landmark strategy because both relational and
landmark strategy led to the same outcome.
Results
Success
Overall, we found no differences in performance between
species (Kruskal–Wallis test: v2 = 2.107, P = 0.366,
df = 2, N = 16). They performed at above chance levels
(Wilcoxon test: z = 3.267, P \ 0.001, N = 16), however,
Searching array
Hiding array
H3 H2 H1
S3 S2 S1
Searching array
S1 S2 S3
H1 H2 H3
Hiding array
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Position of the cups in a Right side trials and b Left side trials.
The solid arrows show, which cup in the searching array apes would
choose, when using the relational similarity between cups (spatial
relation strategy). The dashed arrows show the cup that apes would
choose, if they just went for the closest cup (proximity strategy).
When reward is hidden under cup H1, apes will choose cup S1 using
either of the two strategies. When food is hidden under cups H2 and
H3, apes have to use spatial relation strategy (cups S2 and S3,
respectively) to find a hidden reward
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the performance of the apes varied substantially depending
on which cup hid the food reward (Friedman test:
v2 = 20.258, P \ 0.001, df = 2, N = 16, Fig. 4). Apes
performed at above chance level (chance = 33%) when
cup H1 was baited (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.482, P \ 0.001,
N = 16) and at below chance level when cup H2 was
baited (Wilcoxon test: z = 3.085, P = 0.002, N = 16).
When cup H3 was baited their choices were random. More
specifically, we found no species differences in perfor-
mance when cups H1 (Kruskal–Wallis test: v2 = 1.029,
P [ 0.5, df = 2, N = 16) and H2 (Kruskal–Wallis test:
v2 = 2.414, P [ 0.3, df = 2, N = 16) hid the food reward.
In contrast, chimpanzees and bonobos performed better
(both 48%) than orangutans (25%), though not signifi-
cantly, when cup H3 hid the food reward (Mann–Whitney
test: z = 1.547, P = 0.07, N = 16).
Proximity strategy?
When a food reward was hidden under the H1 cup, both
proximity and relational strategy led to the same cup—S1.
When the middle cup (H2) was baited, apes chose the
closest cup (S1) at above chance levels (Wilcoxon test:
z = 3.337, P \ 0.001, N = 16). However, they chose cup
S1 more often when cup H1 was baited (Wilcoxon test,
z = 2.192, P = 0.028, N = 16). Finally, when the reward
was hidden under the H3 cup, apes did not choose the
closest cup at above chance levels (Wilcoxon test:
z = 1.297, P = 0.211, N = 16).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 provide no straightforward
answer regarding the strategy apes used in our choice tasks.
Similarly as in Experiment 2, some of the results of
Experiment 3 could be explained by proximity strategy, but
not all—when cup H3 was baited, the chimpanzees and
bonobos tended to choose in the Search array a cup with
the same relative position.
In cases where both proximity and relational strategies
were successful (cup H1), apes consistently chose the
correct cup (cup S1). When these two strategies led to a
different cup choice, however, apes’ choices were not
consistent with only one strategy. When a food reward was
hidden under the middle cup (H2), apes mainly chose the
closest cup (S1); however, they chose S1 in this situation
less often than when cup H1 was baited. When apes had
seen a food reward being hidden under cup H3, chimpan-
zees and bonobos, unlike orangutans, seemed to mainly
follow a relational strategy.
General discussion
Over Experiments 1, 2 and 3, we presented apes with three
different spatial mapping tasks in which they were required
to find a food reward in one array of cups after witnessing
the experimenter hiding a food reward in a different array
of cups. The two arrays of cups were either positioned one
behind the other (in two rows), or next to each other (in one
line). In Experiment 1, where the two arrays were always
positioned in one line, apes’ success in finding the food
reward was at chance. In Experiment 2, the positions of the
two arrays varied between being in two rows and being in
one line. When they were in one line, apes’ success was
again at chance; however, when the arrays were in two
rows, apes found the reward at above chance levels. In
Experiment 3, the two arrays were positioned in two rows,
but misaligned. Apes’ performance was again above
chance, but lower than when the two arrays were aligned
one behind the other. Overall, then, it appears that the
major variable affecting apes’ success was the constellation
of the two arrays.
As was proposed earlier, one possible explanation for
this constellation dependent performance is that apes
employed a strategy in which they simply chose the cup
that was closest to the reward they saw hidden in the
Hiding array—the proximity strategy. Numerous studies
have reported that apes’ choices are often biased by
proximity to a reward and that apes regularly experience
difficulty inhibiting this proximity-based response bias
(Barth and Call 2006; de Blois et al. 1998; Call 2001).
However, proximity fails to explain the results perfectly.
The second possible strategy might be the relational
strategy—choosing the cup in the Search array that held
the same relative position as the baited cup in the Hiding
array. To be capable of comparing the arrays relationally,
correctly mapping left cup in the Hiding array to left cup in
the Search array, for example, apes would need to encode
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Fig. 4 Experiment 3. Species’ mean percent correct for each
individual cup (cup 1, cup 2, and cup 3)
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each array of cups as one unit, comprised of three items
that hold special relations to one another, but the units as a
whole are contained within a bigger spatial framework,
relative to a subject; hence, to engage in relational map-
ping, apes must use an egocentric frame of reference.
However, assuming that apes predominantly used a rela-
tional strategy in our tasks also does not fit perfectly with
the present results. It does not explain, for example, why
apes in the One line condition of Experiment 2 preferen-
tially chose the cup in the Search array that held the same
relation to the table edge as the baited cup in the Hiding
array. Neither can the relational strategy explain the low
performance of apes on matching the middle cups in all
constellations of Experiments 2 and 3. In light of the above,
we provide an alternative account of apes’ choice behavior
in our Experiments that we feel provides a better expla-
nation for the observed pattern of results.
In this alternative account, rather than viewing the
individual cups as part of one unit (an array), apes are
assumed to treat them as individual units within a larger
spatial framework. Within this framework, cups are put in
relations to some elements that are external to the target
array and to the subject itself, that is, an allocentric, rather
than an egocentric, frame of reference is employed (for a
similar account described with children, see Huttenlocher
and Presson 1979). Nonhuman primates, and other animals,
readily use landmarks when searching for hidden food
(Deipolyi et al. 2001; Dolins 2009; MacDonald et al. 2004;
Menzel 1996; Potı` et al. 2005, 2010; Sutton et al. 2000).
There are even some indications from spatial memory
studies that primates remember the location of a baited
container better when it is located in a salient location, such
as at the edge of a platform or tray, as opposed to when it is
located somewhere else on the platform (Hoffman and
Beran 2006; Kubo-Kawai and Kawai 2007). Moreover,
human’s spatial recall is influenced by visible boundaries,
symmetry axes (Huttenlocher et al. 1994; Spencer et al.
2001), explicit visual landmarks (Diedrichsen et al. 2004),
and by one’s long-term memory of the target locations
(Spencer and Hund 2003).
Given the above, we believe that in Experiments 2 and 3
when apes saw the experimenter hide a food reward
underneath one of the cups in the Hiding array, they
encoded that cup’s position in relation to the nearest
landmark. Subsequently, they would search under the cup
in the Search array that was nearest the same landmark—
the landmark strategy. Although we cannot be sure for
certain, we favor the edge of the table (as opposed to the
edge of the array) as the most plausible landmark for the
following reason. When the arrays were in two rows in
Experiments 3, one of the exterior cups was located at the
edge of the table, while the other exterior cup was located
in the middle of the table. Subjects performed better with
the cups near the edge of the table than the cups in the
center of the platform (see Fig. 4). However, future studies
are needed to confirm this finding.
The reduced performance of apes when the middle cup
was the baited cup does not contradict this alternative
account of encoding cups by landmarks. Following this
alternative account, the middle cup, in comparison with the
other two cups, was not positioned near a specific landmark
(no matter the condition). Rather, it was situated next to the
cup that was next to a landmark. Alternatively, it could also
be said that the middle cup was situated between two cups,
or between two landmarks. Either way, it was defined by
two relations, in contrast to the left and right cups that were
defined by only one relation. Relations between one object
and a single landmark, such as ‘‘next to’’, ‘‘above’’,
‘‘below’’, are understood by infants earlier than, for
example, the relation ‘‘between’’, where one object is put in
relation to two landmarks (Quinn et al. 2003). For instance,
children of 2 years of age are able to use one landmark to
find a toy that is hidden in its vicinity (DeLoache and
Brown 1983), while children of 4 years of age are able to
find a toy hidden in the middle of two landmarks (Simms
and Gentner 2008; Uttal et al. 2006). There has been some
evidence that nonhuman primates can also learn to search
in the middle of the landmark configuration, but their
precision in searches is far from being perfect (Potı` et al.
2010).
Children’s performance on relational reasoning tasks is
influenced by a multitude of factors: surface similarity
between the base and target problem (Holyoak et al.
1984), children’s knowledge about the relations tested
(Goswami 1991; Goswami and Brown 1990), the number
of relations needed to be mapped (Halford et al. 1998;
Kroger et al. 2004; Richland et al. 2006), the type of
instructions given (DeLoache et al. 1999; Loewenstein
and Gentner 2005), and the presence of a distracter object
in the target problem (Rattermann and Gentner 1998;
Richland et al. 2006). Analogously, to investigate non-
human primates’ analogical abilities, ideally we should
present them with different tests, varying along similar
levels of relational complexity. Additionally, other
dimensions such as size could also be explored. Size rela-
tions are probably a better choice because they are not
ambiguous. A similar searching task with size relations has
already been conducted with capuchin monkeys (Kennedy
and Fragaszy 2008).
In summary, we expected that apes would spontaneously
encode the cups by their relation to the other cups in an
array and potentially map together left–left, middle–
middle, and right–right cups. Instead they appeared to
employ a different approach and encode them by their
relation to the table edge and therefore mapped together the
cups that shared the same relations to nearby landmarks.
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Abstract We investigated whether chimpanzees, bono-
bos, and orangutans encoded the location of a reward
hidden underneath one of three identical cups in relation to
(1) the other cups in the array—i.e., the relative position of
the baited cup within the array; or (2) the landmarks sur-
rounding the cups—e.g., the edge of the table. Apes wit-
nessed the hiding of a food reward under one of three cups
forming a straight line on a platform. After 30 s, they were
allowed to search for the reward. In three different exper-
iments, we varied the distance of the cups to the edge of the
platform and the distance between the cups. Results
showed that both manipulated variables affected apes’
retrieval accuracy. Subjects’ retrieval accuracy was higher
for the outer cups compared with the Middle cup, espe-
cially if the outer cups were located next to the platform’s
edge. Additionally, the larger the distance between the
cups, the better performance became.
Keywords Landmark use  Spatial encoding  Spatial
cognition  Spatial memory  Spatial frames of reference 
Spatial relations
Introduction
Encoding and remembering the spatial location of various
entities including food sources, conspecifics, and predators
is essential for the survival of many animal species. There
are several different types of information that animals can
use when encoding location, but they fall under two main
categories: egocentric information and environmental
information. An individual using egocentric spatial coding
localizes objects with respect to its own body position (see
Newcombe and Huttenlocher 2000; Shettleworth 2010 for
reviews), whereas an individual using environmental
information uses allocentric spatial coding, which localizes
objects in relation to external reference points. These
external reference points can be any object or feature of the
environment (landmarks), or the geometric shape of the
environment that the individual can use to orient and
navigate toward its goal (Cheng and Newcombe 2005;
Chiandetti et al. 2007; Sovrano et al. 2007). The use of
landmarks to find a target location is widespread in the
animal kingdom (see Cheng and Spetch 1998; Spetch and
Kelly 2006 for reviews).
In the present study, we investigated how great apes
encoded the location of a food reward placed underneath
one of three identical cups resting on a platform and
forming a straight line. As the three cups were identical,
subjects needed to use spatial information to locate the
baited cup. This information could be egocentric, allo-
centric—e.g., the cup’s distance from an external landmark
(e.g., the table edges)—or relational—i.e., the cup’s rela-
tive position within the array.
In a similar task, cats (Fiset and Dore 1996) and dogs
(Fiset et al. 2000) primarily used egocentric (or directional)
information about the position of a hiding container (i.e.,
left or right of their body) to find a food reward. However,
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when egocentric information became unreliable (i.e., they
were moved before they were allowed to choose), they
used allocentric spatial information. Fiset and Dore (1996)
further tested which of the two possible allocentric cues
they were encoding: the relative position of the hiding
container within the array (i.e., the left, middle, or right
container) or the container’s distance from the walls. They
found that cats used the distance from the walls as
cues, rather than the relative positions of the containers.
Chickadees (Brodbeck 1994), bumblebees (Church and
Plowright 2006), and pigeons (Legge et al. 2009) have all
been shown to preferentially encode the global location of
a rewarded stimulus. Interestingly, however, chickadees
(Brodbeck 1994) and pigeons (Spetch and Edwards 1988)
have also been found to use local cues (i.e., the surrounding
stimuli) when encoding a reward’s position, and chicks
have been found to be able to discriminate between two
identical boxes by their relative positions (i.e., the left or
right box) (Vallortigara and Zanforlin 1986).
In experimental settings, primates have been shown to
have very good spatial memory (e.g., Garber and Paciulli
1997; MacDonald 1994; MacDonald and Agnes 1999;
MacDonald and Wilkie 1990; Menzel 1973). Moreover,
numerous studies have found that nonhuman primates
readily use landmark cues to search for hidden food (e.g.,
Deipolyi et al. 2001; Dolins 2009; MacDonald et al. 2004;
Menzel 1996; Potı` 2000; Potı` et al. 2010; Sutton et al.
2000). Additionally, primates can successfully find a
reward that they have seen placed under one of several
identical, linearly arrayed opaque containers (Albiach-
Serrano et al. 2010; Barth and Call 2006; Call 2001; de
Blois and Novak 1994; de Blois et al. 1998; Deppe et al.
2009; Fedor et al. 2008; Mendes and Huber 2004). In most
of these studies, comparable retrieval accuracy has been
shown for all the containers when a single food reward is
hidden (Albiach-Serrano et al. 2010; Barth and Call 2006;
Call 2001; de Blois and Novak 1994; de Blois et al. 1998;
Deppe et al. 2009; Fedor et al. 2008; Mendes and Huber
2004). However, Beran et al. (2005) reported that when
two rewards were hidden in a 5- and 7-container array,
chimpanzees were more accurate in retrieving these
rewards when the rewards were hidden either in the
external positions or in adjacent containers. The authors
suggested that the chimpanzees’ mistakes were the result of
memory errors concerning the exact location of the second
hidden item. Furthermore, they argued that it may be easier
to remember the location of food hidden in the extreme
containers as these containers do not have distracter con-
tainers on both sides.
In line with the above prediction, Hoffman and Beran
(2006) found similar results when only one food reward was
hidden in a 3- or 4-container array. That is, chimpanzees
performed worse when the Middle cup(s) contained food
than when either of the two outer cups were baited. In this
study, however, after observing a reward being hidden in
one of the containers, chimpanzees had to walk around the
array, therefore turning 1808. As before, the authors sug-
gested that this worse performance on the Middle
cup(s) was likely due either to the distracting foils located
on both sides of the Middle cup(s), or to the more salient
features that surrounded the outer containers. Interestingly,
chimpanzees were equally successful with all cups when
they remained and made their choice from the original
position. The authors suggested that chimpanzees used both
allocentric and egocentric spatial cues when they did not
move, but when they moved to a new position—meaning
that allocentric and egocentric cues led to different con-
tainers—then chimpanzees showed a preference for allo-
centric cues. Other studies have further supported this
notion that great apes prefer allocentric over egocentric
coding when they are forced to move (Albiach-Serrano
et al. 2010; Haun et al. 2006b). However, none of these
studies directly investigated the specific allocentric cues
that primates may use to encode a reward’s location.
Recently, Hribar et al. (2011) presented chimpanzees,
bonobos, and orangutans with a search task in which they
had to locate a reward in a 3-cup array, after observing a
reward being hidden in a different but identical 3-cup
array. To be successful, apes needed to choose the cup in
the second array that was in the same relative position as
the baited cup in the first array. Apes showed no evidence
of using the relative position of the baited cup as a cue to
search for the hidden reward. Rather, apes preferentially
mapped together the cups from the two arrays that held a
similar relation to the table’s edge and midpoint (land-
marks). Specifically, apes’ performance was worst when
the Middle cup was baited, which the authors suggested
was due to the absence of a differential landmark cue next
to that cup. However, it is also possible that apes performed
worst on the Middle cup because the cups surrounding it
may have exerted a distracting influence, as suggested by
Beran et al. (2005).
The goal of the current study, therefore, was to inves-
tigate whether apes encoded the location of a hidden
reward in relation to (1) the other cups in the array (i.e., the
relative position of the baited cup within the array) or (2)
the landmarks surrounding the array (e.g., the edge of the
table). In addition, we examined whether apes might be
using egocentric information as well (i.e., left or right of
their own body). Apes witnessed the hiding of a food
reward under one of three cups which rested on a platform
and formed a straight line. After 30 s, the apes were
allowed to search for the reward from their original posi-
tion. We imposed a time delay because previous studies
have shown near ceiling performance when using a 3-cup
array (including the Middle cup) and no delay, and a
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marked decrease in performance when using a 3-cup array
and a 30-s delay (Barth and Call 2006). In addition, the
experimenter lured subjects away from the array to break
their visual contact with the cups for a short time, which
has also been shown to interfere with their performance
(Hoffman and Beran 2006). In order to make them leave
the array, apes were offered a low-value food at a different
location, and this interaction with the experimenter prob-
ably represented additional distraction for them. In three
experiments, we varied the distance between the cups and
the distance of the array to the edge of the table. We tested
chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans to investigate inter-
species differences. Previous studies have shown that
chimpanzees outperform orangutans in some spatial tasks
(Albiach-Serrano et al. 2010; Barth and Call 2006; Herr-
mann et al. 2007). In the present study, we tested the
putative superiority of chimpanzees over orangutans in
spatial cognition in the absence of displacements.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, apes observed a food reward being hidden
underneath one of three physically identical cups standing
next to each in a straight line. After 30 s, the ape was
allowed to search for the reward. Here, we wanted to
examine whether apes would be more successful in finding
the reward when it was hidden underneath the Left and
Right cups than when it was hidden underneath the Middle
cup.
Methods
Subjects
Six chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), five bonobos (Pan
paniscus), and five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) housed
at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Centre, Zoo
Leipzig, participated in this study (see Table 1). Their ages
ranged between 7 and 35 years. There were 11 females and
5 males. Three chimpanzees, three bonobos, and two
orangutans were nursery reared, and the rest were mother
reared. The apes live with their conspecifics in spacious
indoor and outdoor areas (combined space: chimpanzees:
1,740 m2, bonobos: 2,620 m2, orangutans: 1,999 m2).
They are fed several times a day, and they were never food
deprived during our study. Water is available to them
ad libitum, as well as during testing. They were tested
individually in their sleeping rooms, except for five mothers
that were accompanied by their infants. Most of the apes
have previously participated in various experiments con-
cerning spatial encoding (Haun et al. 2006a, b; Kanngiesser
and Call 2010), episodic-like memory (Martin-Ordas et al.
2010) and spatial mapping (Haun and Call 2009; Hribar
et al. 2011).
Materials
We used one array consisting of three identical plastic cups
(d = 8 cm) arranged in a straight line on a blue tray
(31 cm 9 14 cm). This array always rested on the left half
of a sliding table (80 9 35 cm) from the experimenter’s
viewpoint (see Fig. 1a). The outer cups were situated next
to the edges of the tray, and the distance between the cups
was 3.5 cm. The distance of the left-most edge of the tray
(and therefore of the Left cup) from the table’s edge was
8 cm. As a low-value food, we used small slices of carrot
for all subjects. With the exception of one orangutan where
banana pellets were used, grapes served as a high-value
food for the subjects.
Procedure
The sliding table was fixed to a mesh panel
(70 cm 9 50 cm) through which apes could observe and
Table 1 Apes tested in this study
Name Sex Age (years)a Rearing Experiment
Chimpanzees
Jahaga F 16 Mother 1, 2, 3
Fifi F 16 Mother 1, 2, 3
Trudi F 16 Mother 1, 2, 3
Alexandra F 9 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Annett F 9 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Alex M 8 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Bonobos
Luiza F 5b Mother 3
Ulindi F 15 Mother 1, 2, 3
Yasa F 11 Mother 1, 2, 3
Limbuko M 13 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Kuno M 12 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Joey M 27 Nursery 1, 2, 3
Orangutans
Raaja F 6b Mother 3
Kila F 9b Mother 3
Dunja F 36 Nursery 1, 2
Padana F 11 Mother 1, 2, 3
Pini F 20 Mother 1, 2, 3
Dokana F 21 Mother 1, 2, 3
Bimbo M 28 Nursery 1, 2, 3
a Age at the time of Exp1; Exp2 was done six and Exp3 15 months
after Exp1
b Age at the time of Experiment 3
Anim Cogn
123
point to the cups. At the beginning of each trial, all cups lay
on their sides with the opening facing toward the subject.
Initially, apes observed the cups being overturned
(‘‘closed’’) while a food reward was placed underneath one
of the cups. At this point, the timer was started. After 5 s,
the experimenter got up and went to a second panel (approx.
2 m away) either to the left (for the orangutans and the
chimpanzees) or to the right (for the bonobos) and offered
subjects a small piece of carrot. While some subjects did not
always eat the piece of carrot, it was always the case that
subjects approached the experimenter. When the subject
followed the experimenter to receive a carrot, she had to let
the baited cup out of her sight. The experimenter then
waited 20 s at the second panel before returning to the table.
When 30 s had elapsed, she pushed the table forward and
the subject could point through the mesh to the chosen cup.
Each subject received one session of 12 trials. Each cup was
baited four times in a semi-random order; the same cup
could only be baited twice in a row.
Scoring and data analysis
We filmed all sessions, and scoring was done live as well as
subsequently from the videos. We scored which cup (Left,
Middle, Right) apes chose, and the dependent measure was
the percentage of correct trials. A second coder scored
20% of trials (approx. 20% for each species) to assess
inter-observer reliability, which was excellent (Cohen’s
kappa = 0.96). Preliminary analyses showed no sex dif-
ferences in performance on any of the cups, and as such, we
did not include this variable in the subsequent analyses. To
test whether there was a difference in performance in the
three cups, and whether there were any species differences,
we conducted a mixed 3 (Cups) 9 3 (Species) analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with Cups as the within-subjects var-
iable and Species as the between-subjects variable. Per-
formance on each cup was also compared against chance
level using a one-sample t test. As apes could choose from
three cups, chance level was set at 33.3% correct.
Carrot 
bonobos
Opaque panel
carrot
(a)
(b)
Carrot 
chimpanzees
Hydraulic 
door
Hydraulic 
door
Fig. 1 Experimental setup for a Experiments 1 and 2. Depicted is a
testing room with a setup for the bonobos and chimpanzees (with one
difference—the bonobos had to walk to the right panel and the
chimpanzees to the left panel to get carrot). For the orangutans, a
room and a setup were an exact mirror picture of the bonobos’ setup.
b Experiment 3. The setup was the same for all species. The arrows
indicate the second panel where the apes were offered a piece of
carrot
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Results and discussion
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct trials as a
function of the baited cups’ position and species. On
average, apes correctly selected the Left and Right cups in
90% and 82.5% of trials, respectively, which was above
chance (T15 [ 9.070, P \ 0.001, in both cases). In contrast,
the Middle cup was correctly selected in only 48% of trials,
which was not significantly above chance (T15 = 1.829,
P = 0.087). ANOVA revealed main effects of Cups
(F2, 26 = 15.135, P \ 0.001) and Species (F2, 13 = 7.908,
P = 0.006), but no interaction between these factors
(F4, 26 = 2.015, P = 0.122). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
tests revealed that the apes found the reward significantly
more often when it was hidden under the Left cup
(P \ 0.001) and the Right cup (P = 0.011) than when it
was hidden under the Middle cup. There was no difference
in apes’ performance on the Left and the Right cups
(P = 0.965). Orangutans performed significantly worse
than chimpanzees (P = 0.005), but no significant differ-
ence was found when their performance was compared
with bonobos’ (P = 0.087). There was no significant dif-
ference between chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ performance
(P = 0.565).
In summary, apes had greater difficulty in retrieving a
reward hidden underneath the Middle cup compared with
the outer two cups. In the next experiment, we tested two
possible explanations for this difference. The first expla-
nation is that each cup was encoded by way of the two
relations it held with the other two cups. The Left cup is
left of the other two cups; the Right cup is right of the other
two cups; and the Middle cup is left of the Right cup and
right of the Left cup. Note that this might explain the
decreased performance in the Middle cup, as both the Left
and Right cups (by virtue of being at the extremities) hold
the same relation with the other two cups, whereas the
Middle cup’s position is in between the other two cups,
meaning it holds two different relations with the other
cups. The second explanation is that apes encoded the three
cups in relation not to the other cups, but to external ref-
erence points. These external reference points, or land-
marks, could be the edges of the tray on which the cups
rested, the edges of the table, or possibly, the middle of the
table. Edges of a platform and boundaries have been found
to be quite salient landmarks for nonhuman animals
(Cheng and Sherry 1992; Hoffman and Beran 2006;
Kubo-Kawai and Kawai 2007). Humans’ spatial recall is
also affected by visual boundaries (Bullens et al. 2010;
Huttenlocher et al. 1994) and by symmetry axes, such as an
invisible middle line dividing a space into two halves
(Huttenlocher et al. 1994). Hribar et al. (2011) also sus-
pected that apes in their study might be using the middle of
the table as a reference point. The Left and Right cups
therefore had an obvious landmark next to them, whereas
the Middle cup was somewhere between the edge and the
middle of the table. As such, it did not have a specific
landmark of its own next to it, but it had to be defined by
two landmarks, which previous studies have shown is a
demanding task for primates (MacDonald et al. 2004;
Marsh et al. 2011; Potı` et al. 2005, 2010; Sutton et al.
2000).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we placed the three cups over the whole
length of the table (Full table condition), so that the Left
and Right cups stood next to the table’s edges and the
Middle cup occupied the position in the middle of the
table. Thus, all three cups were located near a salient
landmark—table’s edges and the middle of the table. The
predictions are that if the apes encode the cups by their
relation to nearby landmarks, then their performance on
the Middle cup will now not differ from their perfor-
mance on the other two cups. However, if the apes
encode the cups using their spatial relation within the
array, then once again they should perform worse on
the Middle cup. We wanted to compare the results from
the Full table condition with the results from Experiment
1, but since it was conducted 6 months after Experiment
1, we decided to run Experiment 1 (henceforth Half table
condition) again, so as to make sure that the apes’ per-
formance on the original spatial memory task did not
change during this time.
Subjects
Subjects were the same as in Experiment 1.
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Fig. 2 Experiment 1: apes’ percentage correct for each cup as a
function of species. Bars represent standard error
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Materials
Materials were exactly the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
There were two conditions: the Half table and the Full table
condition. The Half table condition was identical to
Experiment 1. In the Full table condition, the three cups
were placed directly on the table, spread out over its whole
length. The cups were separated by a distance of ca. 17 cm.
The rest of the procedure was exactly the same as in the
Half table condition. All subjects participated in both
conditions, which were blocked in 12 trials and presented
on separate days. Half of the subjects started with the Half
table condition, and the other half of the subjects started
with the Full table condition. The position of the food
reward was semi-randomized; the same position (cup) was
not baited on more than two consecutive trials. All subjects
walked over to the experimenter when she offered them a
piece of carrot at the second mesh (again some did not eat
it) except one bonobo. This one bonobo chose to stay in
front of the cups in some trials, but he did not look at the
cups continuously during the 30-s interval.
Scoring and data analysis
Scoring was done in the same way as in the previous
experiment. Inter-observer agreement was 100% (Cohen’s
kappa = 1). Preliminary analyses showed no sex differ-
ences in performance on any of the cups, and as such, we
did not include this variable in the subsequent analyses. To
investigate the effect of the baited cups’ position in the two
conditions, we conducted a 3 (Cups) 9 2 (Condition) 9 3
(Species) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Cups and
Condition serving as within-subjects variables, and Species
serving as a between-subjects variable. To compare the two
conditions on each cup separately, we conducted paired-
samples t tests (two-tailed).
Results and discussion
Figure 3 separately presents the percentage of correct trials
as a function of the baited cups’ position and species for
both conditions. ANOVA revealed main effects of Cups
(F2, 26 = 14.228, P \ 0.001), Condition (F1, 13 = 18.670,
P = 0.001), and Species (F2, 13 = 7.286, P = 0.008). There
were also two significant interactions: Cups 9 Condition
(F2, 26 = 7.344, P = 0.003) and Cups 9 Condition 9
Species (F4, 26 = 3.381, P = 0.024).
The effect of species was due to the lower performance
of the orangutans compared with the chimpanzees
(P = 0.018) and the bonobos (P = 0.015). There was no
significant performance difference between the chimpan-
zees and the bonobos (P [ 0.05).
Because the key variable of interest was Condition, we
investigated the pattern of the three-way interaction by
conducting a mixed 3 (Cups) 9 3 (Species) ANOVA
separately for each condition. In the Half table condition,
we found a main effect of Cups (F2, 26 = 13.470,
P \ 0.001) but not of Species (F2, 13 = 1.943, P = 0.183),
and the interaction between these factors was not signifi-
cant (F4, 26 = 2.007, P = 0.123). Bonferroni-corrected
post hoc tests revealed that the main effect of Cups was due
to the apes’ significantly lower performance on the Middle
cup (47%), relative to the Left (87.5%, P = 0.001) and the
Right cups (74%, P = 0.024). These results replicate the
results of Experiment 1: The apes were significantly
impaired in remembering where the reward was hidden
when it was underneath the Middle cup.
In the Full table condition, we found a main effect of
Species (F2, 13 = 6.657, P = 0.010), a marginal effect
of Cups (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F1.363, 17.714 =
3.771, P = 0.057), and no reliable interaction between
these factors (F4, 26 = 1.978, P = 0.128). Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests again showed that the orangutans
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Fig. 3 Experiment 2: percentage of correct responses for each cup as
a function of species in a Half table condition, b Full table condition.
Bars represent standard error
Anim Cogn
123
performed significantly worse than the chimpanzees
(P = 0.030) and the bonobos (P = 0.016). The apes per-
formed better on the Right cup compared with the Middle
cup (P = 0.009), but there was no difference between the
Left and the Middle cups or between the Left and the Right
cups (P [ 0.05).
We further compared apes’ performance on the three
cups in the Half table condition with their performance on
the three cups in the Full table condition. Apes performed
significantly better on the Middle cup (T15 = 4.743,
P \ 0.001) and the Right cup (T15 = 2.671, P = 0.017) in
the Full table condition, but there was no significant dif-
ference between conditions on the Left cup (T15 = 0.522,
P = 0.609). Finally, we compared the results from
Experiment 1 with the results from the Half table condition
of Experiment 2 to investigate whether apes’ performance
had changed with additional experience. It had not: The
apes’ performance in the two experiments did not signifi-
cantly differ on any of the three cups (T15 \ 1.05,
P [ 0.31, in all cases).
To summarize, apes performed significantly better on
the Middle cup when it stood in the middle of the table
(Full table), compared with when it did not (Half table).
Additionally, subjects also performed significantly better
on the Right cup when it stood near the edge of the table
(Full table), compared with when it stood in the middle of
the table (Half table). Since the relations between the cups
are the same in both table conditions, these data fail to
support the idea that subjects were using the relative spatial
position of the cups to encode food location. Instead, it
appears that apes encoded each cup separately in relation to
a specific landmark.
Apes’ high performance on the cups located near the
table’s edges suggests that edges are important landmarks
for the encoding of spatial location. Of course, in the Half
table condition, apes could have potentially used the tray
edge as a landmark cue. However, the observed decrease in
performance in the Half table condition when the Right cup
was moved away from the table’s edge suggests that they
did not use the tray edge, but rather the table edge and/or
the middle of the table. Indeed, the difference in perfor-
mance on the Middle cup between the Full and the Half
table conditions suggests that the middle of the table was
likely used as a landmark.
However, it is still possible that apes may have ignored
the middle of the table as a landmark, focusing solely on
the table’s edges as landmark cues. If true, this would mean
that the closer a cup is to one of the table’s edges, the easier
it will be for apes to remember that a reward is located
underneath that cup. Thus, the difference between the
conditions in the performance on the Middle cup may not
be due to its different position within each condition, but
rather to the distance between the cups within each array.
Note, in the Full table condition, the cups were further
apart than in the Half table condition, and as such, it might
have been easier for the apes to remember under which cup
the reward was hidden. In the next experiment, we sought
to disentangle these possibilities.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 suggested that apes encoded the location of
the baited cup with regard to external landmarks based on
geometric cues (middle of the table) or physical properties
of the environment (table’s edge). In the current experi-
ment, we examined how distance to the landmarks and
distance between cups affected subjects’ choices.
Methods
Subjects
Six chimpanzees, six bonobos, and six orangutans socially
housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Centre,
Zoo Leipzig, participated in this experiment (see Table 1).
There were 13 females and 5 males ranging in age between
4 and 28 years. Subjects were tested individually in their
sleeping rooms, except for six mothers that were accom-
panied by their infants.
Materials
We used an array of three identical metal round cups
(d = 6 cm) and three testing tables (Small: 26.5 9 35 cm;
Medium: 45 9 35 cm; Large: 82 9 35 cm). Cups were
placed on a moving platform which was the same length as
the table, but 10 cm narrower. As a low-value food we
again used small slices of carrot, and as a high-value food
we used grapes, except for one orangutan that received
banana pellets.
Procedure
We followed the same basic procedure as in previous
experiments. First, we placed the 3-cup array on a platform
in front of the mesh panel (83 cm 9 50 cm). All tables
with the corresponding platforms were always positioned
in the center of the testing mesh panel. Each trial started
with all three cups being ‘‘opened’’ (right way up). The
experimenter ‘‘closed’’ (upturned) two of the cups and then
placed a food reward underneath the last cup. After 5 s, the
experimenter got up and walked to a mesh panel to her left,
where she offered the subject a small piece of carrot. All
subjects walked over to the experimenter when she offered
them the piece of carrot (some did not eat it), except two
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bonobos that chose to stay in the place where they had
observed the hiding in some trials. As soon as the subject
approached the experimenter to take the carrot, an opaque
panel forced the subject to break eye contact with the cups
(see Fig. 1b). After 20 s, the experimenter went back to the
testing table, and after 30 s, she pushed forward the plat-
form on which the cups rested, so the subject could point to
one of them. There were four conditions that differed in the
positioning of the cups on the table (either occupying one
half of the table or the full table) and in the distance
between the cups (which could either be small or large)
(Fig. 4).
1. Full table Near The cups occupied the whole length
of the Small table such that the Left cup rested 1 cm
from the left edge of the table, the Right cup rested
1 cm from the right edge of the table (Edge cups),
and the third cup was positioned between them in the
middle of the table (Middle cup). The distance
between adjacent cups was 3.25 cm.
2. Full table Far This condition was identical to the Full
near condition except that we used the Medium table.
This resulted in a distance between adjacent cups of
12.5 cm.
3. Half table Near The cups occupied only half of the
Medium table. This meant that one cup always stood
1 cm from the table’s edge (Edge 1 cup), one cup
always stood in the middle of the table (Edge 2 cup),
and one cup always stood between the Edge 1 and
Edge 2 cups (Middle cup). In the first half of trials, the
cups were placed on one side of the table, and in the
second half of trials, the cups occupied the other side
of the table. The starting side (left or right half of the
table) was counterbalanced across subjects. The
distance between adjacent cups was 3.25 cm.
4. Half table Far This condition was identical to the
Half near condition except that we used the Large
table, resulting in a distance between adjacent cups
of 12.5 cm.
The only difference between the Full table Near and the
Full table Far conditions, and between the Half table Near
and the Half table Far conditions, is the distance between
the cups. Therefore, if apes performed better on the Far
conditions than on the Near conditions, this would be a
strong evidence that inter-cup distance affects apes’ per-
formance. Similarly, there is only one difference between
the Full table Near and the Half table Near conditions, and
between the Full table Far and the Half table Far condi-
tions. Specifically, the Full table conditions have two cups
directly located at the table edges, and the Half table
conditions have only one cup directly located at a table
edge. As such, if apes performed differently on the outside
(Left or Right cups) cups that were directly located at the
table’s edge and the outside cups that were in the middle of
the table, then this would be a strong indication that apes
were using landmarks—table edge to encode the location
of the baited cup—and not egocentric cues, such as the
angle and the distance from their body to the baited cup.
Additionally, by comparing performance on the Middle
cup in the Full table Near and Half table Near conditions,
and in the Full table Far and Half table Far conditions, we
can test whether the apes were using the middle of the table
as a landmark.
Subjects received four 12-trial sessions (one session per
condition). Starting condition was counterbalanced across
subjects, and the order of the conditions was different for
every subject. The position of the reward was semi-ran-
domized; the same position (cup) was not baited on more
than two consecutive trials.
Scoring and data analysis
Scoring was done in the same way as in the previous two
experiments. Inter-observer reliability was excellent
(Cohen’s kappa = 0.99). Preliminary analyses showed no
sex differences in performance on any of the cups, and as
such, we did not include this variable in the subsequent
analyses. Variables of interest were the distance between
cups (far or near), the positioning of the array (over the
whole table or over one half of the table), and the cups’
position on the table. Due to the fact that the outer two cups
in the Full table conditions were both Edge 1 cups (i.e.,
placed directly at a table’s edge), but in the Half table
conditions the two outer cups were two different types of
Full table-Near 
Full table-Far 
Half table-Near 
Half table-Far 
3.25cm 
12.5cm 
26.5cm 
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82cm 
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Fig. 4 The positioning of the cups for the four conditions. L Left cup,
M Middle cup, R Right cup, E1 Edge1 cup, E2 Edge2 cup
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Edge cups—one at the edge and the other in the middle of
the table—we analyzed the Half and Full table conditions
separately. Therefore, a mixed 2 (Distance) 9 3 (Cups) 9 3
(Species) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Distance
and Cups as within-subjects variables, and Species as a
between-subjects variable, was conducted separately for
each condition. In addition, to compare each condition’s
performance against chance (33.3%), we conducted one-
sample t tests. Moreover, we compared individual cups
between conditions with paired-samples t tests.
Results and discussion
Figures 5 and 6 present the percentage of correct responses
for each cup as a function of species for all four conditions.
Overall, apes found the hidden food reward above chance
levels (33%) in all conditions (Full table Near: 65%,
T17 = 9.25, P \ 0.001; Full table Far: 81%, T17 = 7.29,
P \ 0.001; Half table Near: 62%, T17 = 13.15, P \ 0.001;
Half table Far: 76%, T17 = 12.68, P \ 0.001).
ANOVA for the Full table conditions revealed main
effects of Distance (F1,15 = 19.636, P \ 0.001), Cups
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F1.223,18.338 = 41.948,
P \ 0.001), and Species (F2, 15 = 5.157, P = 0.020). Apes
found the reward more often in the ‘‘Far’’ condition (81.5%)
than in the ‘‘Near’’ condition (65%). Bonferroni-corrected
post hoc tests revealed that apes’ success was higher on the
Left and Right cups (the Edge cups) compared with the
Middle cup (both Ps \ 0.001), and that the bonobos per-
formed better than the orangutans (P = 0.019). There were
no other species differences. There was also a significant
interaction between Distance and Cups (Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected, F1.385, 20.769 = 4.506, P = 0.035). To investigate
this interaction, we compared the three cups in the Near and
Far conditions separately. In both conditions, apes’ success
varied on the three cups (Near: F2,34 = 15.421, P \ 0.001;
Far: F2,34 = 37.155, P \ 0.001). Bonferroni-corrected post
hoc tests showed that, in both conditions, apes’ success was
higher on the Left and Right cups than on the Middle cup (all
Ps \ 0.002). However, this difference was more pronounced
in the Near condition (87.5%, 29.2%, 77.5%, Left, Middle,
Right cup, respectively) than in the Far condition (93.1%,
58.3.1%, 93.1%, Left, Middle, Right cup, respectively).
ANOVA for the Half table conditions also revealed
main effects of Distance (F1,15 = 16.399, P = 0.001),
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Fig. 5 Experiment 3: percentage of correct responses for each cup as
a function of species in a Full table Near condition, b Full table Far
condition. Bars represent standard error
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Fig. 6 Experiment 3: percentage of correct responses for each cup as
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condition. Bars represent standard error
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Cups (F2, 30 = 19.203, P \ 0.001), and Species (F2,
15 = 4.435, P = 0.031). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
tests revealed that apes performed better on the Edge 1 cup
(91%) than on both the Edge 2 cup (70%, P = 0.013) and
the Middle cup (45%, P \ 0.001). Additionally, apes’
success was higher on the Edge 2 cup than on the Middle
cup (P = 0.024). Again, apes located the food reward more
often in the ‘‘Far’’ condition (76%) than in the ‘‘Near’’
condition (62%), and bonobos outperformed orangutans
(P = 0.029). There were no significant interactions
between factors.
In both analyses, there was an effect of Distance: Apes’
success was higher when the cups in the array were put
further apart. By examining Figs. 5 and 6, we see that in
the Full table and Half table conditions this effect was
highest for the Middle cup. We were also interested in
whether this was true for the outer cups too. As such, we
compared the two Full table conditions on the Left, Middle,
and Right cups, and we compared the two Half table
conditions on the Edge 1, Middle and Edge 2 cups. There
was a significant difference between the two Full table
conditions in all three cups, with performance on the
Far condition being higher (Left cups: T17 = 2.204,
P = 0.042; Middle cups: T17 = 3.580, P = 0.002; Right
cups: T17 = 2.500, P = 0.023). However, in the Half table
conditions, apes performed differently only on the Middle
cup (T17 = 3.449, P = 0.003).
We further wanted to examine whether the apes found
the reward that was hidden underneath the Middle cup
more often when it stood in the middle of the table com-
pared with when it did not. Consequently, we compared the
Full table Near condition with the Half table Near condi-
tion, and the Full table Far condition with the Half table Far
condition. There were no significant differences in either of
these comparisons (T17 [ 0.170, P [ 0.5, both cases).
Even though the above results already suggest that apes
did not use egocentric information to find the hidden
reward (i.e., apes performed equally well on the Left and
Right cups in the Full table conditions, but not on the Edge
1 and Edge 2 cups in the Half table conditions), we
investigated in more detail the possibility that apes used
egocentric cues. One indication whether apes were using
egocentric cues would be if they systematically used their
left hand to point to the Left cup, and their right hand to
point to the Right cup. We examined apes’ choices in all
four conditions. In the Full table Near, Half table Near, and
Half table Far conditions, only one subject (a different one
in each condition) consistently indicated to the Left and
Right cups with their left and right hands, respectively. In
the Full table Far condition, three subjects indicated to the
Left and Right cup with the corresponding hand 100% of
the time (one additional subject in 7/8 times). Eight sub-
jects always used the same hand to point with (6 with the
left hand and 2 with the right), and the rest of the subjects
did not show any preference. The low number of subjects
that consistently used the corresponding hand indicates that
apes did not use their body cues to encode location.
However, if pointing to the cups with the corresponding
hand did help the apes to better recall the position of the
hiding cup, then we should expect higher performance on
the Left and Right cups for those subjects who consistently
used the corresponding hand than for those who always
used the same hand. We performed this analysis only for
the Full table Far condition, and we found no significant
differences between the groups (Mann–Whitney test:
Z \ 0.41, P = 1.0, N = 12, both cups).
In summary, there were four main results: apes had most
trouble remembering the reward’s location when it was
placed underneath the Middle cup, no matter what its
position on the table. In other words, we did not find any
evidence that apes were using the middle of the table as a
landmark. Second, apes’ success was higher when the
distance between the cups was larger; however, this effect
was more pronounced for the Middle cup. Third, we did
not find any evidence that the apes were using egocentric
cues. Finally, the apes were most successful when the
reward was hidden underneath a cup that was located at
the very edge of the table, suggesting that the apes used the
table edges as landmarks.
General discussion
We investigated how chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangu-
tans encoded the location of a reward hidden underneath
one of three identical cups that formed a straight line on a
platform. Two main factors were found to affect apes’
retrieval accuracy: the distance between the cups and the
position of the cups in relation to the platform’s edge. The
larger the distance between the cups, the better perfor-
mance became. Additionally, subjects’ retrieval accuracy
was higher for the outer cups than for the Middle cup,
particularly when the outer cups were located next to the
platform’s edges. Although the pattern of responses was
the same for all three species in all experiments, chim-
panzees and bonobos outperformed orangutans in every
cup constellation except in the Half table condition of
Experiment 2.
Our results offer no support for the relational hypothesis
(i.e., that the apes encoded the position of the baited cup in
relation to the other two cups in the array). This hypothesis
predicts that apes should have performed equally well in all
three experiments, given the fact that the cups maintained
the same relations in all experiments, despite changes in
the proximity between cups and with respect to the table’s
edges. Contrary to this prediction, our results showed that
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both manipulations substantially affected apes’ retrieval
accuracy. Specifically, apes’ superior retrieval accuracy for
cups located near the edges of the table strongly suggests
that apes used these as landmarks, thus supporting the
landmark-coding hypothesis (i.e., that the apes encoded the
position of the baited cup in relation to a nearby landmark).
Following the landmark hypothesis, the apes encoded
the cups’ positions with regard to their relation to the
table’s edge. The outer cups (the Left cup and the Right
cup) were both defined by a single relation—i.e., being
near to an edge of the table—whereas the Middle cup could
be defined as either the second cup to one edge of the table,
or the cup situated between the two edges of the table. It is
conceivable, therefore, that apes’ retrieval accuracy on the
Middle cup was lowest due to the requirement that two
relations needed to be encoded. Not surprisingly, having to
encode a location in relation to two landmarks is cogni-
tively more demanding than encoding that location in
relation to only one landmark. For example, children are
able to guide their search behavior in relation to one
landmark much earlier (at 2 years of age) (DeLoache and
Brown 1983) than they are able to guide their search
behavior in relation to two landmarks (at 4 years of age;
e.g., when having to find a reward in the middle of two
landmarks) (Simms and Gentner 2008; Uttal et al. 2006).
Similarly, there are numerous reports that while nonhuman
animals can use single landmarks to effectively find food,
they struggle when they have to use two or more landmark
cues relationally (MacDonald et al. 2004; Marsh et al.
2011; Potı` et al. 2005, 2010; Sutton et al. 2000).
We also considered the possibility that subjects used a
geometric landmark, such as the middle of the table.
However, this possibility was not supported by the data.
Specifically, placing the Middle cup in the middle of the
table, as opposed to placing it to one side, did not affect
apes’ retrieval accuracy. Moreover, the lack of a difference
between these conditions also suggests that the edge of the
table was used as a landmark only for the cup closest to
that edge. Interestingly, the Middle cup in the Half table
condition was closer to one edge than the other, just like
the outer cups were closer to one edge than to the other.
However, no difference between these cups was detected,
and this may suggest that edges lose their benefits when
another cup is closer to them.
Despite the advantage afforded by the use of edge
information for accurate food retrieval, edge information
alone is not sufficient to explain the subjects’ success, as in
some conditions both the far left and the far right cups were
near edges. In order to choose accurately, subjects also
needed to encode some information to identify the correct
edge—i.e., the left or the right edge. Humans and animals
usually do not encode locations using only one fixed
strategy. Instead, they apply different strategies in different
situations, depending on what information is available
to them (Burgess 2006; Cheng and Newcombe 2005;
Kanngiesser and Call 2010). Even though, we did not find
any evidence that the apes were predominantly using ego-
centric cues, apes may still have encoded egocentric cues
and then combined these cues with the allocentric cues
(e.g., the cup at the edge on my ‘‘left’’ side). Data from
transposition tasks lend support to this possibility, showing
that apes encode both egocentric and allocentric cues
(Albiach-Serrano et al. 2010; Hoffman and Beran 2006). In
these transposition tasks, apes first observed an experi-
menter hide a reward in one container and then they had to
walk around the array before they were allowed to choose.
This manipulation, therefore, changed the apes’ perspec-
tive by 1808 from their original location. Consequently,
egocentric information was no longer reliable, whereas
allocentric information was. Apes performed worse on such
transposition tasks (i.e., when they had to move around the
array) than when they could choose from their original
position, where both types of information were viable
(Albiach-Serrano et al. 2010; Hoffman and Beran 2006).
One further possibility with regard to how apes kept
apart the left and the right edges could be that apes enco-
ded, together with the table edge, some additional land-
mark, subsequently using these landmarks hierarchically.
In the natural environment, there are always multiple
landmarks or cues that an animal can potentially use to
encode the location of something. Animals and humans
have been shown to encode multiple spatial cues und use
them hierarchically (e.g., Brodbeck 1994; Cheng and
Sherry 1992; Fiset and Dore 1996; Fiset et al. 2000; Gibbs
et al. 2007; Gouteux et al. 2001; Legge et al. 2009; Spetch
and Edwards 1986; Uttal et al. 2006). Furthermore, they
prefer the closest (Cheng and Sherry 1992; Goodyear and
Kamil 2004), more stable (Biegler and Morris 1999;
Learmonth et al. 2001), and larger landmarks (Bennett
1993; Gouteux et al. 2001) that are part of the environment.
We can only speculate, which this additional landmark
could be: maybe an adjacent cage or the side to which they
had to walk to get a carrot.
In the current study, absolute positioning of the cups
was stable; hence, their relations with the surrounding
environment also remained stable. This fact is a key reason
why we believe the landmark strategy, and not the ego-
centric or the relative strategy, emerged as a predominant
strategy in the apes tested here. One could argue that apes’
own position to the baited cup was the same at the time of
baiting and at the time of choosing and that it is therefore
surprising that the egocentric strategy was not the preferred
one. However, subjects’ position did not remain stable
throughout the trials—they moved to a different position to
receive a carrot and they did not (always) return to exactly
the same place. This would also explain the discrepancy
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between the chimpanzees’ almost perfect performance in
the Hoffman and Beran’s study (2006)—when a visual
barrier was placed between them and the array but they did
not need to move—and the less than perfect performance
of the apes in our study.
Our data are consistent with the previous reports
showing that chimpanzees and bonobos outperform
orangutans in spatial cognition tasks that involve dis-
placements (Albiach-Serrano et al. 2010; Barth and Call
2006; Herrmann et al. 2007). The current study shows that
these differences in spatial cognition can also be extended
to a task without reward displacements. As things stand at
the moment, we do not have a good explanation for why
these species differences in spatial cognition tasks exist,
and we can only speculate at this point. We can rule out
that this difference is related to diet, as both chimpanzees
and orangutans are fruit specialists. Moreover, we can rule
out the idiosyncrasy of the Leipzig populations as a
potential explanation, because two other studies on dif-
ferent (and larger) ape populations also found differences
between chimpanzees and orangutans in spatial cognition
(Haun and Call 2009; Herrmann et al. 2007). It is possi-
ble, therefore, that other factors, such as the level of
sociality and/or terrestriality, might help explain the
observed inter-species differences in spatial cognition. In
particular, chimpanzees and bonobos, by virtue of their
higher degree of sociality than orangutans, may have a
greater capacity to keep track of the movements and
locations of their group members than orangutans.
Another possibility for the observed differences might be
that orangutans, by virtue of being more arboreal than
chimpanzees and bonobos, are less skillful than the Afri-
can apes at encoding precise spatial information based on
landmarks. These hypotheses, however, require empirical
verification.
In conclusion, we found that apes encoded the location
of a reward by referencing each cup with a different
landmark (e.g., the left and the right edges of the table).
Although the reduced retrieval accuracy for the Middle cup
has been reported in the previous studies (Beran et al.
2005; Hoffman and Beran 2006; Hribar et al. 2011), this
study links this deficit in performance with the position of
the cups in relation to the landmarks provided by the
table’s edges. Moreover, this study also demonstrates that
reducing the distance between cups, irrespective of their
relation to key landmarks, also substantially reduces
retrieval accuracy.
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Children’s reasoning about spatial relational similarity: the effect of alignment 
Hribar Alenka, Haun Daniel, Call Josep 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s dependence on the alignment of the base 
and target arrays in a spatial mapping task. Children were required to find a reward in 
an array of three identical cups after observing the reward being hidden in another array 
of three cups. The arrays were either aligned one behind the other in two rows, or placed 
side by side forming one line. Moreover, children were rewarded for two different 
mapping strategies: Half of the children had to choose a cup that held the same relative 
position as the baited cup in the other array - they had to map Left-Left, Middle-Middle 
and Right-Right cups together (Aligned group). The other half needed to map together 
the cups, which held the same relation to the table’s special features – the cups at the 
edges, the middle cups, and the cups in the middle of the table (Landmark group). 
Results showed that children’s success was constellation dependent: performance was 
higher when the arrays were aligned one behind the other in two rows than when they 
were placed side by side. Furthermore, children showed a preference for landmark- over 
aligned-based mapping.  
 
Keywords analogy, spatial relations, relational reasoning, landmark use, similarity 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of humans’ most powerful cognitive tools for mental organization is reasoning by 
analogy - the perception and use of like relational patterns across contexts. This ability 
has been argued to be one, or even the driving force behind humans’ mental prowess 
(Gentner, 2003). An analogy reveals common structure between two situations and, 
based on these similarities, suggests further inference.  
Theories of analogy have divided the phenomenon into several individual 
processes: retrieval, mapping, evaluation, abstraction and re-representation (Gentner & 
Colhoun, 2010). Arguably the most crucial one amongst them is mapping. Mapping 
describes the alignment of the representational structure of two situations in order to 
deduct similarities between them, which will in consequence allow for inferences from 
the base to the target situation (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991). The ontogeny of mapping 
abilities is characterized by the so-called “relational shift” (Gentner & Rattermann, 
1991). Early in ontogeny, children judging similarity of two scenes attend solely to 
overall similarity or to object-level commonalities; later they shift their attention to 
relational similarity. Only after the age of 3-4 onwards do they start to appreciate 
relational similarities; although at that age they still find it hard to inhibit reacting on the 
basis of object similarity when it is pitted against relational similarity (Markman & 
Gentner, 1990; Paik & Mix, 2006, 2008; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). In addition, a 
progression from an easier to more difficult problem increases their performance on the 
difficult problem (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). 
One of the domains in which this developmental pattern of relational mapping 
becomes apparent in young children is the spatial domain. In most spatial mapping 
tasks, children are required to find a hidden object in a target array of hiding places after 
they have observed an experimenter hide the same object in a different array. In order to 
be able to infer the location of a hidden object in the target constellation based on 
knowing the position of a similar object in the base constellation, they have to recognize 
similarities in spatial organization between the two arrays (e.g., Loewenstein & 
Gentner, 2005). Children’s ability to map spatial relations rests heavily on object 
matches – they perform better when the two arrays contain highly similar objects 
(DeLoache, de Mendoza, & Anderson, 1999; DeLoache, Kolstad, & Anderson, 1991). 
Children have even been reported to correctly interpret element-to-element 
correspondences before they could fully appreciate spatial relational correspondences 
(Blades & Cooke, 1994). Blades and Brooke (1994) tested children’s mapping ability 
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between two model rooms, which had two unique and two identical hiding places. To 
differentiate between the identical hiding places, children had to take spatial 
relationships into account – something that 5-year-olds, and not 3- and 4-year-olds, 
were able to do; however, 4-year-olds succeeded when the two model rooms were 
spatially aligned. Moreover, if children are first required to map between two spatial 
arrays with high object-similarity, they subsequently perform better on an array with 
low object-similarity, than if they do not get experience with the highly similar array 
(Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001).  
Recently, the ability to map spatial relations has been investigated in our closest 
living phylogenetic relatives, the other great apes (Haun & Call, 2009; Hribar, Haun, & 
Call, 2011). In a spatial mapping task, apes were required to map the left, middle, and 
right cups of the base array to the left, middle, and right cups of the target array. It 
appears that after the relational shift, children generally outperform the other great apes 
on spatial mapping tasks (Haun & Call, 2009). Crucially, Hribar et al.(2011) varied the 
constellation of the two arrays - i.e., aligned one behind another, misaligned, and next to 
each other forming one line - and found that non-human great apes’ performance was 
highly dependent on the relative positioning of the base and target arrays – they 
performed best when the two arrays were aligned one behind another and worst when 
the arrays were in one line. This indicated a degree of inflexibility in their mapping 
abilities (Hribar, et al., 2011). Moreover, authors reported that apes did not map 
together the cups that held the same relative position within the arrays – i.e., the left, 
middle, and right cups; instead, they appeared to encode the baited cup in the base array 
in a relation to a nearby special feature or a landmark (i.e., table’s edge) and then they 
chose a cup from the target array that was also near that same landmark. These results 
indicated that apes’ low performance on the one line constellation was due to apes’ 
different spatial encoding strategy. Hribar and Call (2011) later demonstrated that 
indeed, when apes are presented with a linear array of identical-looking cups placed on 
a platform, they encode the baited cup by its relation to the table’s edge and not by its 
relation to other cups.   
Children’s strategies to encode space, their relative reliance on certain cues over 
others, and their use of spatial frames of reference change throughout childhood (Haun, 
Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006; Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006; 
Learmonth, Newcombe, & Huttenlocher, 2001; Nardini, Burgess, Breckenridge, & 
Atkinson, 2006; Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000). At 1.5-2 years of age children start 
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using single landmarks to search for a hidden toy in their vicinity (DeLoache, 1986; 
DeLoache & Brown, 1983; Learmonth, et al., 2001; Newcombe, Huttenlocher, 
Drummey, & Wiley, 1998). At the age of 4-5 years, children can learn that a reward is 
hidden in the middle of two landmarks (Simms & Gentner, 2008; Spetch & Parent, 
2006; Uttal, Sandstrom, & Newcombe, 2006), but fail when the location needs to be 
encoded in a relation to 4 landmarks (MacDonald, Spetch, Kelly, & Cheng, 2004). 
Four-year-olds are also successful in differentiating between two identical objects by 
their relation to a nearby landmark (being close or far), a platform’s edge (next to it or 
in the middle of the platform) and in a relation to an platform edge’s length (at the 
shorter edge or at the longer edge) (Vasilyeva, 2002). However, they fail when they 
need to encode a hiding container in a relation to two other containers in the array – one 
identical to the hiding array, and one unique, which could potentially be used as a 
landmark (Lee, Shusterman, & Spelke, 2006). Nardini et al. (2006) investigated how 
children aged between 3 and 6 encoded a location of a toy, which was hidden in an 
array of 12 identical cups, placed on a platform and surrounded on two edges of the 
platform by landmarks. By varying the consistency of the array’s position in the respect 
with the child and the testing room, and by holding the toy’s position constant in the 
respect of the array and bordering landmarks, they were able to explore which spatial 
frame of reference – egocentric (i.e., encode a location in a relation to their body), 
allocentric (i.e., encode a location in a relation to the environment) or intrinsic (i.e., 
encode a location in a relation to other objects in an array) - children used. Three- and 
four-year-olds were found to use egocentric and allocentric cues to retrieve hidden toys, 
whereas children at the age of 5 years and older additionally used cues intrinsic to the 
array and landmarks. However, the characteristics of these ontogenetic trajectories vary 
dependent on the cultural context (Haun, Rapold, et al., 2006). 
The present study had three main objectives: First, we investigated how 
alignment of the arrays affects children’s mapping performance. We presented children 
with two 3-cup arrays, which were either aligned one behind another in two rows, or 
were placed next to each other forming a line. Based on the previous studies that found 
that children and apes performed better on the mapping tasks when the two arrays were 
aligned, we expected that the children in our study will find the task easier when the two 
arrays were placed in two rows, than when they were in one line. In addition, we were 
interested to see whether those children who were first presented with the easier (i.e., 
two rows) constellation, would consequently perform better on the more difficult (i.e., 
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one line) constellation than the children that were presented with the one line 
constellation first. Second, we investigated, which spatial relations children would find 
easier to map: relative position within the array (left-left, middle-middle and right-right 
cups) or relative position on the table (i.e., cup at the edge-cup at the edge, cup in the 
middle of the table-cup in the middle of the table). Finally, unlike most previous studies, 
we did not provide children with explicit instructions that they should compare the two 
arrays and search in the same place. This allowed us to investigate children’s relational 
mapping while minimizing the effect of language and to more directly compare 
children’s responses to previous studies with non-human great apes (Hribar, et al., 
2011); in particular, to search for similarities and differences in flexibility and 
preferences in spatial mapping strategies, which might indicate homologies between 
species irrespective of a higher overall performance in humans. 
 
METHOD 
Participants  
Twenty-four 4-year-old children (mean age = 48.2, SD = 1.7, range 45.7 - 51 
months) and twenty-four 5-year-old children (mean age = 60.8, SD = 1.6, range 57.4 - 
62.7 months) participated in this study. Half of the children in each age group were girls 
and the other half were boys. All children were recruited from local kindergartens. They 
were tested individually in a familiar room in their kindergarten. Children could stop 
participating at any time; one child stopped. The sample size reported above is the final 
number after exclusion. 
 
Material 
We used two arrays of three identical metal square cups (8.5cm x 8.5cm). Each 
array was placed on a yellow plastic tray (32cm x 12.5cm) resting on a wooden testing 
table (50cm x 80cm). In both conditions the distance between the trays as well as the 
distance between the cups within each array was 3.5 cm. We used small (3.5 x 3.5cm) 
cartoon animal pictures as rewards. 
 
Procedure 
After a short warm-up time in a group, a child was taken to a separate room in 
the kindergarten where the apparatus was set up. The child sat at the middle of the 
testing table opposite to the experimenter (E). E then showed her some animal pictures 
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and explained her that they would play a game, where E would hide pictures underneath 
the cups and she could then search for them. If the child found a picture she could keep 
it. There was no specific mention that two pictures would be hidden – one underneath 
each array. There was also no mentioning that pictures would be under the same 
positioned cups in both arrays, nor that they would have to find a pattern or a rule of the 
“game”. After this short introduction of the “game”, the experiment started.  
 
 
 
Condition  
 Two rows  One line  
     
     
Aligned 
 
Mapping 
Strategy 
Group 
 
Landmark 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
     
Fig. 1. Experimental set-up: positioning of the two arrays in the Two rows and One line 
conditions. The arrows indicate the corresponding cups. 
 
There were two conditions. In the Two rows condition, both arrays were placed 
on the left half of the table, aligned one behind another, six centimeters from the left 
table’s edge. In the One line condition, the arrays were placed side by side, each resting 
on the opposite halves of the table, the left array resting six centimeters from the left 
edge and the right array six centimeters from the right edge (see Figure 1). For both 
conditions the procedure was the same. One of the arrays was designated as a Search 
array and the other as a Hide array. In the Two rows condition, the Search array was the 
array closer to the child, and in the One line condition it was the left array (from E’s 
view). At the beginning of each trial all six cups were empty and laying on their side, 
L      M      R 
Search array             Hide array 
L     M      R L     M      R 
L      M      R 
Search array              Hide array 
L     M      R L     M      R  Search array 
 
 
 
 Hide array 
 Search array 
 
 
 
 Hide array 
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the opening facing the child. An occluder was put on the table between the child and the 
arrays, so that she could see that E was hiding one picture, but could not see underneath 
which cup. After E had hidden a picture underneath one of the cups in the Search array, 
all three cups in the Search array were upturned (closed) and the occluder was removed. 
The cups in the Hide array were still opened and the child could observe E first close 
two of the cups and then place a picture underneath the cup that remained open cup in 
the hide array and then close that cup as well. Finally, E pushed forward the tray with 
the Search array for one tray’s width (ca. 12.5cm; note that in the One line condition 
this means that the two arrays were not forming a continuous line anymore) and asked 
the child where the picture was. If she indicated a cup in the Hide array, E pushed the 
Search tray back and forward again and said: “Yes, but where do you think the picture 
is here?” Children could either point to or lift the chosen cup. If the child was correct, 
she kept the picture and E opened all the remaining cups and removed the picture from 
the Hide array. If the child was wrong, E opened all the cups and took both pictures 
away without making any reference to the position of the pictures. 
Each child received one block of 12 trials of each condition (24 trials total) in 
one session. There was a short (ca. 5-10min) break between the blocks. Half of the 
children started with the Two rows condition and the other half with the One line 
condition. Each position (left, middle, right) was bailed four times per condition, the 
order of the position being semi-randomized – the same position was not rewarded on 
more than two consecutive trials. 
There were two different mapping strategies children could be rewarded for: 
Aligned and Landmark strategy. For the Aligned strategy, the two baited cups from the 
two arrays had the same relative position within the array. Thus, if the baited cup in the 
Hide array was left, middle or right, then the baited cup in the Search array was also 
left, middle or right, respectively. For the Landmark strategy, the two baited cups in the 
two arrays had the same relation to a landmark (i.e., table’s special feature) next to 
them. Thus, in the Two rows condition, the cups that were in the same relative position 
also had the same landmark next to them (e.g., both the left cups were at the table’s 
edge). In the One line condition however, if the baited cup in the Hide array was the cup 
in the middle of the table (the left cup), then the baited cup in the Search array was also 
the cup in the middle of the table (the right cup). Therefore, in the Two rows condition 
both strategies led to the same cup, whereas in the One line condition, except for the 
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middle cup, they did not (see Figure 1). Half of the children were assigned to one 
strategy and the other half to the other strategy. 
 
 Scoring and data analysis 
All sessions were videotaped and scoring was done live as well as subsequently 
from the videos. We scored which cup (Left, Middle, Right) the children chose and the 
dependent measure was the percentage of correct trials. A second coder scored 20% of 
the trials of each condition and strategy group to assess inter-observer reliability, which 
was perfect (Cohen’s kappa = 1).  
In the Two rows condition, both mapping strategies (Aligned and Landmark) led 
to the same cups (L-L, M-M, R-R). In the One line condition on the other hand, the two 
strategies led to different cups (except for the middle cup). Therefore, we decided to 
analyze the two conditions separately with the following factors: age (4 and 5 years), 
the rewarded mapping (Aligned and Landmark strategy), the order of condition 
administration (administered first or second), and the position of the baited cup (left, 
middle, right). We conducted a 2 (Age) × 2 (Strategy) × 3 (Position) × 2 (Order) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the % of correct responses, separately for the two 
conditions. Position was within-subjects variable and Age, Strategy and Order of 
conditions were between-subjects variables. To compare children’s performance against 
chance (33%), we conducted a one-sample t-test; to compare the performance on the 
two conditions, we used paired-samples t-test (two-tailed); and to compare individual 
performance against chance, we used a binomial test. 
Apes in Hribar et al.’s study (2011) tended to use the landmark strategy in the 
One line condition, even though they were always rewarded only for the aligned 
strategy. Therefore, we were interested to see, whether the children from the Aligned 
group also tended to choose cups following the landmark strategy (even though they 
were not rewarded for it). We coded Aligned group’s responses irrespective of their 
success and compared their percentage of choices following the landmark strategy 
against chance (33%) with a one-sample t-test. 
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RESULTS 
 
 
Fig.2. The percentage of correct responses for each condition and rewarded mapping strategy as 
a function of age. * - denotes above chance performance (p<0.05). Bars represent standard 
error. 
 
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct responses for each condition and 
strategy group as a function of age. In the Two rows condition 4-year-olds from both 
strategy groups chose the correct cup more often than expected by chance (Aligned 
group: 48.6%, t(11) = 2.454, p = 0.032; Landmark group: 60.4%, t(11) = 3.228, p = 
0.008). In the One line condition, on the other hand, 4-year-olds from both strategy 
groups performed at chance levels (Aligned group: 34%, t(11) = 0.267, p = 0.795; 
Landmark group: 43.1%, t(11) = 1.654, p = 0.126). Five-year-olds from both strategy 
groups performed above chance in both conditions (Aligned group: Two rows 
condition, 77.8%, t(11) = 5.722, p < 0.001; One line condition, 51.4%, t(11) = 2.203, p 
= 0.050; Landmark group: Two rows condition, 73.5%, t(11) = 4.954, p < 0.001; One 
line condition, 54.9%, t(11) = 3.148, p = 0.009). Children’s retrieval accuracy was 
higher in the Two rows condition than in the One line condition (t(47)= 5.160, p < 
0.001).  
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A 2 (Age) × 2 (Strategy) × 3 (Position) × 2 (Order of condition administration) 
ANOVA of the Two rows condition revealed main effects of Age (4-year-olds: 54%, 5-
year-olds: 76%; F(1, 40) = 8.422, p = 0.006) and Order (Two rows condition presented 
first: 56%, Two rows condition presented second: 74%; F(1, 40) = 5.925, p = 0.019) 
and no significant interactions. The ANOVA of the One line condition revealed main 
effects of Age (4-year-olds: 38.5%, 5-year-olds: 53%; F(1, 40) = 5.207, p = 0.028) and 
Position (Left: 37%, Middle: 57%, Right: 44%; F(2, 80) = 6.625, p = 0.002). There was 
also a significant interaction between Strategy and Position (F(2, 80) = 3.165, p = 
0.048). To investigate the pattern of the interaction we conducted an ANOVA, with a 
baited cup’s position (Position) as within-subject factor, separately for the two Strategy 
groups. The performance of the Aligned group differed on the three cups: Left 33%, 
Middle 62%, Right 33% (F(2, 46) = 8.455, p = 0.001), whereas the performance of the 
Landmark  did not: Left 40%, Middle 53%, Right 54% (F(2, 46) = 1.148, p = 0.326).  
 
Table 1 
Percentage of correct choices for the two conditions when presented as first or second. 
 Aligned group  Landmark group 
Order of Presentation Two rows One line  Two rows One line 
First      
4-year-olds 41.7 (0) 37.5 (0)  48.6 (1) 41.7 (1) 
5-year-olds 73.6 (4) 52.8 (2)  61.0 (3) 47.2 (2) 
M 58  45   55 44 
Second         
4-year-olds 55.6 (4) 30.6 (0)  72.2 (3) 44.4 (1) 
5-year-olds 81.9 (5) 50.0 (2)  86.1 (5) 62.5 (3) 
M 69 40  79 53 
Note. Numbers of children that passed the condition are in parentheses. 
 
Individual analysis revealed that in the Two rows condition, eight 4-year-olds 
(four from each rewarded strategy group) and 17 5-year-olds (9 from aligned group and 
8 from landmark group) selected the baited cup above chance, and that in the One line 
condition two 4-year-olds (both from the Landmark group) and nine 5-year-olds (4 from 
the Aligned and 5 from the Landmark group) selected the baited cup above chance 
(Binomial test, P < 0.05). 
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We were interested in whether children’s performance became better over the 
trials in each condition. We compared the success on the first 6 trials with the success 
on the last 6 trials of each condition. There was no learning effect for the Two rows 
condition (t(47) = 1.881, p = 0.066), but there was a learning effect for the One line 
condition (t(47) = 4.228, p < 0.001).  
 
Table 2 
Percentage of correct choices across the three positions 
  Position of the reward 
  Left Middle Right 
Aligned strategy    
Two rows 4-year-olds 38 54 54 
 5-year-olds 77 79 77 
          M 56.5 65.5 64.5 
     
One line 4-year-olds 23 50 29 
 5-year-olds 44 73 38 
          M 33.5 61.5 33.5 
Landmark strategy   
Two rows 4-year-olds 54 56 70 
 5-year-olds 67 90 65 
          M 60.5 73 67.5 
     
One line 4-year-olds 29 52 48 
 5-year-olds 50 54 60 
          M 39.5 53 54 
 
 
The ANOVAs did not show a difference in the overall performance between the 
Landmark and Aligned groups in neither of the conditions, but there was a difference 
between the strategy groups in their success on the three cups in the One line condition. 
The difference between the aligned and landmark strategies can be seen only in the One 
line condition, more specifically, only when the Left or the Right cup were baited (the 
aligned strategy would lead in the Search array to the Left and the Right cup, 
respectively; and the landmark strategy would lead to the Right and the Left cup, 
respectively; see Figure 1); when the Middle cup was baited, both strategies led to the 
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same cup – the Middle cup. Therefore, we decided to exclude the trials where the 
Middle cup was baited, and to compare the two strategy groups in the One line 
condition again. The results showed that now the difference in the performance of the 
Landmark and Aligned groups approached significance (t(46)= 1.965, p = 0.056).  
Moreover, as already mentioned above, when all trials were included in the 
analysis, then the 5-year-olds from both strategy groups performed above chance in the 
One line condition. However, if we exclude the Middle trials, then the Aligned group’s 
performance in the One line condition is not above chance anymore (t(11)= 0.815, p = 
0.432), whereas the Landmark group still found the reward more often than expected by 
chance (t(11)= 3.622, p = 0.004).  
We also investigated whether the children from the Aligned group tended to 
choose cups following the landmark strategy. Indeed, in the One line condition, children 
that were rewarded for the aligned strategy chose the cups in the Search array following 
the landmark strategy more often than expected by chance (t(23)= 2.623, p = 0.015). 
Individual analyses revealed that three 5-year-olds from the Aligned group selected the 
cups after the landmark strategy at above chance levels (P < 0.05). Similarly, we tested 
whether the children from the Landmark group preferred to choose the cups after the 
aligned strategy, and we found no significant result (t(23)= 1.011, p = 0.323). Moreover, 
none of the children from the Landmark group preferentially chose the cups following 
the aligned strategy.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Children were presented with a spatial mapping task, where the two spatial arrays could 
be positioned in two rows or in one line. We rewarded them for two different types of 
mappings: aligned and landmark mapping. There were four main findings: First, similar 
to prior results in the other great apes, children’s retrieval accuracy was higher, when 
the two arrays were positioned in two rows, compared to when they were forming a 
line. Second, against our expectations, the experience with the Two rows condition did 
not increase children’s performance in the One line condition. Third, in the One line 
condition, children tended to performed better when they needed to use the landmark 
mapping – the mapping spontaneously applied by the other great apes in almost 
identical situation – than when needed to use the aligned mapping. Moreover, even 
some children that were rewarded for the aligned mapping chose the cups following the 
landmark mapping, whereas none of the children rewarded for the landmark mapping 
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preferred to use aligned mapping. Finally, even the younger group performed above 
chance in the Two rows condition without any verbal scaffolding; however, they failed 
in the One line condition. Moreover, 5-year-olds outperformed 4-year-year-olds in both 
conditions.  
 We propose three possible explanations (that could also work in a combination) 
for the first major finding: why children’s performance was higher in the Two rows 
condition than in the One line condition. In the Two rows condition, the Search array 
could be considered more similar to the Hide array than in the One line condition. The 
two arrays in the Two rows condition had almost identical surrounding (e.g., on their 
left the table ended and on their right the table continued), whereas the arrays in the One 
line condition did not. Moreover, a similarity between two spatial scenes that need 
fewer changes to become identical is higher than between two scenes, which require 
more change (Bruns & Egenhofer, 1997). Surface similarity has been shown to have an 
effect on children’s performance in relational mapping tasks (Chen, 1996; Chen, 
Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984; Paik & Mix, 2006). 
Therefore, the higher similarity between the arrays, the better performance became. 
Another explanation could be that in the Two rows condition the two arrays were 
perfectly aligned one behind the other. Studies have shown that children’s mapping 
success was higher when the two comparing scenes were aligned or oriented in the same 
direction (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Bluestein & Acredolo, 1979; Paik & Mix, 2008; 
Presson, 1982; Vasilyeva & Bowers, 2006). Blades and Cook (1994) obtained similar 
results that 4-year-olds succeeded in the spatial mapping task when the spatial layouts 
were aligned, but not when the target layout was rotated in respect to the base layout. 
Some authors have suggested that this alignment allowed children to potentially use the 
help of egocentric cues to solve the task and therefore, the trials with non-aligned scenes 
provided a more reliably measure of the ability to map spatial relations (Blades & 
Cooke, 1994; Vasilyeva & Bowers, 2006). Lastly, in the Two rows condition the 
corresponding cups from the two arrays were also the most proximate cups and 
therefore the children might have chosen the cup from the Search array that was closest 
to the picture reward they saw hidden in the Hide array. The proximity of the 
corresponding cups have been shown to have an effect on children’s spatial mapping 
(Haun & Call, 2009). However, children did not show a preference to pick the closest 
cup in the One line condition, which would be always the same cup, the Right cup, 
irrespective of the position of the baited cup in the Hide array.  Thus, the higher overall 
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similarity of the arrays, their alignment one behind the other, and the proximity of the 
corresponding cups might have increased children’s performance in the Two rows 
condition, compared to the One line condition. 
The second major finding was that we did not find any order effect for the One 
line condition, meaning that presenting the children with a simpler problem (the Two 
rows condition) did not help them to solve the harder problem (the One line condition). 
Surprisingly, children performed better in the Two rows condition, after they were 
presented with the One line condition. This is the opposite result found in other studies 
that have shown that presenting children with a simpler task first, improved their 
performance in the subsequent more difficult task (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; 
Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001). We propose the following explanation for these results. 
As we mentioned earlier, children might have solved the Two rows condition by using 
egocentric or proximity cues rather than the relational mapping, and as a consequence, 
this strategy was not beneficial to them later, when they were presented with the One 
line condition. On the other hand, if they started with the One line condition, there was 
no (easier) alternative strategy available to them. This might have caused them to spend 
more time comparing the two arrays in search of a “game rule”. Indication for this 
would be children’s improvement over trials in the One line condition, and their 
increased performance on the Two rows condition, if it was presented after the One line 
condition. Vasilyeva and Bowers (2010) found that when children compare scenes that 
are to some degree different, are more likely to focus on common relations than on 
common surface features. In contrast, when they are comparing highly similar scenes, 
they are more likely to focus on common features.  
The third finding was that the Landmark and the Aligned group differed in their 
retrieval accuracy in the One line condition (recall that this analysis does not apply to 
the Two rows condition, because there both strategies led to the same cups). The 
Aligned group needed to identify a relation the hiding cup held to the other two cups in 
the Hide array, and then find a cup with the same relation in the Search array. 
Interestingly, the Aligned group was successful when the Middle cup was baited, but 
failed when the Left and Right cups were correct. Nevertheless, we do not believe that 
children mapped the middle relation, but had problems with the left and right relations. 
A more plausible explanation would be that the Middle cup had a special feature that 
made it unique and distinctive from the other two cups – i.e., it was the only cup that 
was surrounded by two other cups. In Lee et al.’s study (2006), when 4-year-olds had 
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been disoriented after observing an object being hidden in one of three hiding containers 
(one distinctive and two identical) forming a triangle, they found the hidden object only 
if it was hidden in the distinctive container and failed when the object was in one of the 
identical hiding places. These findings suggest that 4-year-olds did not encode spatial 
relationship between the three hiding places. Blades and Cooke (1994) found similar 
results with a model room task. They tested children’s mapping ability between two 
model rooms, which had two unique and two identical hiding places. To differentiate 
between the identical hiding places, children had to take spatial relationships into 
account – something that 4-year-olds were only able to do when the two models were 
aligned.  We believe that in the One line condition the Aligned group of children did not 
encode the baited cup’ relative position in the array, and that they were highly 
successful on the Middle cup, because they matched the unique cups. 
The Landmark group was expected to use the “landmark” strategy - to map 
together the cups placed at the table’s edge, the middle cups, and the cups in the middle 
of the table - as great apes were suggested to do (Hribar, et al., 2011). If 4-year-olds are 
presented with two identical objects placed on a platform, they can encode the target 
object’s location in respect to its distance to a nearby landmark, or to a platform’s edge, 
and they can also transfer this information to another identical spatial layout and 
indicate to an object in the same location (Vasilyeva, 2002). Nardini et al. (2006), 
however, showed that when children were presented with 12 identical hiding places, 
only 5-year-olds and older could encode a location of the hidden toy in respect to the 
surrounding landmarks on the platform, the platform edges and the configuration of the 
array. Thus, they encoded a hiding cup in a relation to nearby special features. In our 
study, the platform’s edge could serve as a nearby special feature. The platform’s edge 
or a boundary and the symmetry axis (i.e., the middle of the platform) are very salient 
cues, and affect adults’ and children’s spatial recall (Batty, Spetch, & Parent, 2010; 
Bullens et al., 2010; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994). Therefore, it is 
conceivable that children in our study in the One line condition (possibly in the Two 
rows condition as well) encoded the hiding cup from the Hide array in a relation to 
nearby special features and that they then mapped this relation to the Search array. 
However, children could solve this task, by using other strategies as well. For 
example, children could map together the cups that held a similar relation to themselves 
as a central landmark – i.e., the cups that were furthest away from them, the cups that 
were closest to them, and the cups that were halfway. Alternatively, if in the One line 
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condition, children saw the two arrays as one continuous line, they might have mapped 
together the two endings of the line (the Right cup in the Hide array and the Left cup in 
the Search array) and the two middle parts of the line, for example. However, note that 
before the children were allowed to choose a cup, the Search array was pushed forward, 
and so the continuous line that the two arrays formed was broken.  
To summarize, without any verbal instructions to do so, 4- to 5-year-old children 
spontaneously used information about the location of a picture hidden in the Hide array 
to locate the picture in the Search array. However, children of both ages were affected 
by the constellation of the arrays – they performed better when the two arrays were 
aligned in two rows. Interestingly, their experience with the Two rows condition did not 
improve their performance in the One line condition. Moreover, children tended to 
perform better, when they were rewarded for the landmark mapping – mapping together 
the cups, which held the same relation to the nearby table’s special features. Overall, 
children’s performance was very similar to apes’ performance on a very similar task 
(Hribar et al., 2011), which shows intriguing parallels in ape and children spatial 
mapping abilities. 
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